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The effectiveness and efficiency of railcar inspection is critical to freight railroad operations, as 
it directly affects safety, reliability, mainline efficiency, and terminal performance. Current 
railcar inspection practices are intended to identify defects prior to failure, but they generally do 
not provide predictive maintenance capabilities due to the limitations of manual, visual 
inspection.  As a result, automated condition monitoring technologies (ACMT) have been 
developed to monitor rolling stock condition and facilitate predictive maintenance strategies. 
Through improved railcar condition monitoring, these technologies have the potential to reduce: 
equipment-caused derailments and in-service failures (ISFs), train delays and variability in 
mainline operations, and operational waste in railroad terminals. 
 
In this thesis, I applied lean manufacturing methods to the railcar maintenance process, 
quantifying both direct and indirect waste. To assess benefits to mainline efficiency, I used 
dispatch simulation software to quantify the length and variability of equipment-caused ISFs as a 
function of traffic level. To assess benefits to terminal efficiency, I compared the railroad 
terminal to a manufacturing production system and used lean production techniques to identify 
sources of waste and variability. The results of these analyses indicate that the cost-savings from 
improved mainline and terminal efficiency through the use of ACMT are comparable in scale to 
the cost-savings from the potential reduction in equipment-caused derailments. I also present the 
results of a study investigating the feasibility of a machine vision system to automatically inspect 
freight car structural underframe components.  This research provides a basis for evaluating 
strategies for cost-effective integration of railcar inspection technology, improved railcar 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
1.1  Purpose 
The purpose of this research was to determine the safety and economic implications of 
using Automated Condition Monitoring Technology (ACMT) to augment manual freight car 
inspection practices.  
1.2 Motivation and Background 
 Over the last three decades the railroad industry has made substantial efforts to improve 
safety and efficiency.  Since 1980, train accident rates have declined by 75 percent and employee 
injury rates have declined by 82 percent (Figure 1.1a) (AAR 2010).  As a result, the railroad 
industry has become one of the safest industries in the United States, achieving record minimum 
train accident and employee injury rates in 2009 (AAR 2010).  One might expect that these 
improvements to safety would have come at the expense of employee productivity: “Given 
resources and the state of technology, firms face a trade-off between safety and output” (Aldrich 
2006).  However, throughout the history of the railroad industry, the development, adoption and 
implementation of new technologies has resulted in a shift in the relationship between safety and 
output, allowing both factors to be improved simultaneously.   
Since the passage of the Staggers Act in 1980, economic resources have been more 
readily available to invest in new technology to improve railroad safety and efficiency 
(Gallamore 1999).  This is evidenced by the fact that railroad employee productivity increased 
by over 400 percent from 1980 to 2009 at the same time that industry-wide safety was rapidly 
improving (Figure 1.1a) (AAR 2010b).  Many factors contributed to the gains in safety and 
efficiency including advancements in design and maintenance of freight cars, locomotives, track 
and infrastructure, as well as improvements in data processing and communications (AAR 2009).   
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                    (a)               (b) 
Figure 1.1 Rail Accident and Injury Rates since 1980 (a) (AAR 2010) and Railroad Employee 
Productivity Rates since 1980 (b) (AAR 2010b) 
 
 To maintain a high level of safety, railroads continue to make efforts both to prevent train 
accidents and derailments and to ensure a safe working environment for railroad personnel.  The 
inspection and maintenance of railcars has been a major focus of safety and efficiency since the 
1980s.  In order to ensure the safety of the nearly 1.6 million freight cars operating in North 
America (AAR 2008), the United States Department of Transportation (US DOT) Federal 
Railroad Administration (FRA) has developed a series of regulations governing railcar 
inspection practices (US DOT 2008).  In addition, the Association of American Railroads (AAR) 
maintains freight car interchange rules to improve the effectiveness of freight car maintenance 
practices and to protect the physical infrastructure from potential damage caused by defective 
railcars (AAR 2010d).   
 Railcar inspection has played a large role in the improvement of railroad safety, but it 
also has the potential to directly impact rail transportation efficiency by reducing the risk of in-
service failures.  Throughout this thesis, the term in-service failure (ISF) will refer to an instance 
where one or more defective railcar components cause a train to stop on the mainline.  ISFs can 
result in short stoppages (i.e. 1-2 hours) during which the defective railcar is repaired along the 
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line-of-road or the car is set out in a siding or industry track.  In more serious cases (e.g. a broken 
wheel or axle) an ISF can result in a derailment, causing extended mainline outages of up to 48 
hours.  For a capacity constrained railway network, a mainline delay of any length will have 
costly train delay consequences. 
 In order to reduce the risk of derailments and ISFs, railcar condition must be effectively 
monitored so that cars can be maintained using preventive maintenance strategies.  If the 
condition of a railroad’s rolling stock is not monitored appropriately, the railroad must rely on 
less efficient corrective maintenance, which occurs only after a defect has developed and been 
detected.  Condition-based maintenance (CBM), as opposed to corrective maintenance, is a form 
of preventive maintenance based on vehicle performance and/or parameter monitoring 
(Lagnebäck 2007).  As a result, current railroad inspection practices have been designed to 
facilitate CBM: both the FRA mechanical inspection regulations and AAR interchange rules 
facilitate the repair of defects in their early stages.  Ideally, railcars are repaired before reaching a 
point where they would impose imminent risk of failure.  Unfortunately, the degree to which 
CBM can be realized depends on the effectiveness of the railcar inspection process.  If an 
inspection does not accurately monitor a railcar’s true condition, then the benefits of CBM 
cannot be realized.  
 Current railcar inspection practices require a car inspector, referred to as a carmen, to walk 
or ride a vehicle along the entire length of a train, visually inspecting the mechanical components 
on each car.  Depending on the carmen’s training, experience, and working conditions these 
inspections can be inconsistent in their objectivity and effectiveness.  As a result, a train may be 
inspected to the best ability of a particular carmen, yet defects may be missed.  To improve the 
effectiveness of railcar condition monitoring and take advantage of CBM, the AAR began the 
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Advanced Technology Safety Initiative (ATSI) and Technology Driven Train Inspection (TDTI) 
programs.  The goal of TDTI and ATSI is to promote the develop and implementation of 
automated condition monitoring technologies (ACMT) designed to reduce the risk of equipment-
related ISFs (Hawthorne, Wiley and Guins 2005, Tornay and Cummings 2005, and Robeda and 
Kalay 2008).   
 ACMT consists of durable wayside systems located adjacent to or directly beneath the 
railroad tracks.  Various sensing mechanisms have been designed to collect data from passing 
trains in the form of force, temperature, audio, or visual-based measurements.  Some systems are 
well established within the industry and have been used in revenue service for several decades, 
while other systems are still under development.  The ultimate goal of TDTI is the 
implementation of a network of inspection sites where each component of the train will be 
inspected automatically in real time and critical health information for each car will be 
documented and made available to railroad mechanical department personnel (Robeda and Kalay 
2008, Railway Age 2009). 
 By improving condition-monitoring effectiveness, automated systems have great 
potential to increase both safety and efficiency.  However, these systems can be expensive to 
purchase, install and maintain.  ACMT systems have several important operational requirements 
including: 1) railroad personnel to oversee the system hardware and ensure proper operation and 
maintenance, 2) an electronic infrastructure for storing inspection data and converting the data 
into useful information, and 3) a framework within railroad mechanical maintenance departments 
to apply the information gained from ACMT, making necessary and timely repairs.  Realizing 
the potential benefits to railcar inspection effectiveness will not be achieved simply by 
purchasing and installing a stand-alone system: integrated systems must first be designed and 
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institutional changes adopted before the benefits of ACMT can be fully realized.  Thus, before 
making the decision to implement ACMT systems, railroads must consider both the costs and 
benefits these technologies.  
1.3 Objectives Driving Condition Monitoring Improvements  
 Improved railcar condition monitoring through the use of ACMT has the potential to 
improve both safety and efficiency, resulting in three potential areas of cost savings: reduced 
derailments, reduced terminal dwell and reduced ISFs (Figure 1.2).  By reducing the number of 
equipment-caused derailments, railroads can recover the direct costs associated with track and 
equipment damages, injuries, and mainline delays.  I provide an analysis of track and equipment 
damages and a discussion of injury costs in Chapter 2 and a brief discussion of mainline delay 
due to derailments in Chapter 6.  Through the implementation of Lean Production methods, 
ACMT can facilitate improved yard efficiency, resulting in reduced labor costs (Chapter 5).  
Finally, ACMT can lead to improved mainline efficiency through the reduction of mainline delay 











Figure 1.2 Influence Diagram Showing Economic Benefits of Improved  
Condition Monitoring 
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1.4  Thesis Organization 
 After a brief analysis of rolling stock safety (Chapter 2), and background discussions on 
current railcar inspection practices (Chapter 3) and currently available ACMT (Chapter 4), the 
focus of my thesis will be an analysis of the costs and benefits of improved terminal efficiency 
(Chapter 5) and mainline efficiency (Chapter 6) though the use of ACMT.  I then describe a 
study performed at the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign (UIUC) to determine the 
technical feasibility of developing a machine vision freight car underbody inspection system 
(Chapter 7).  Machine vision is an emerging area of research that has led to the development of 
new ACMT that will be critical to the implementation of railcar condition monitoring “super 
sites” capable of inspecting all safety-critical components on passing trains (Railway Age 2009).  
Thus, Chapter 7 serves as a case study on the technical expertise required for development of 
new ACMT, providing the industry with an understanding of the current status of machine vision 
technology.  In doing so, this thesis will provide a basis for determining future research needs 
regarding ACMT development and implementation (Chapter 8). 
This thesis is divided into eight chapters including an introduction, conclusion and six 
sections within the body wherein I intend to answer the following questions: 
1. How is railcar condition related to railroad safety? (Chapter 2) 
2. What is the current railcar inspection process and how do these inspections affect safety 
and efficiency? (Chapter 3) 
 
3. What is automated condition monitoring technology (ACMT), and how will it impact 
railroad safety and efficiency? (Chapter 4) 
 
4. What is the potential impact of ACMT on terminal efficiency? (Chapters 5) 
5. What is the potential impact of ACMT on mainline efficiency? (Chapters 6) 
 
6. What are the technical requirements for development of ACMT (e.g. machine vision) and 
how will this impact the implementation of technology in the future? (Chapter 7) 
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The content of these chapters mainly includes research and analyses that were presented at 
various technical conferences and/or submitted for publication either in conference proceedings 
or with a formal technical journal.  The following is a brief description of each of the main body 
chapters. 
 
Chapter 2: presented in part at the 2010 Joint Rail Conference (JRC) in Urbana, IL and 
published in the conference proceedings (Schlake et al. 2010) 
 This chapter addresses the impact of railcar condition on railroad safety.  I include a 
literature review of equipment-related railroad safety from the late 19th century to the present 
time.  I chronicle key advancements in railcar technology and safety practices that led to the 
reduction of train accidents and derailments as well as employee injuries.  I then discuss the 
current magnitude of train safety costs through an analysis of the FRA accident database to 
determine the total cost of equipment-caused derailments.  I consider accident costs due to track 
and equipment damages as well as car derailment rates over the period of 1999 to 2008.  
Employee injury and fatality rates were extremely low during this time period and the associated 
costs were considered to be negligible.  Finally, I performed a risk-based analysis of derailment 
causes to determine which railcar component defects represent the greatest derailment risk.  This 
analysis provides a basis for developing an effective approach to derailment mitigation through 
the implementation of ACMT. 
 
Chapter 3:  
 In this chapter I discuss manual railcar inspection.  I first provide a brief history of railcar 
inspection, followed by relevant background pertaining to the role of the FRA and AAR in 
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railcar inspection practices.  The focus of this chapter is a detailed step-by-step description of 
current unit-train inspection practices on Class I railroads.  This description is based on visits to a 
number of railroad terminals (NS, CN, CP, Belt Railway of Chicago, BNSF, Union Pacific, and 
CSX) between July 2008 and October 2009.  Finally, I discuss the accuracy of manual railcar 
inspection as compared to the accuracy of ACMT. 
 
Chapter 4: 
 In this chapter, I first provide a background on the development of wayside detection 
technologies.  I then discuss the difference between reactive inspection systems and ACMT.  I 
provide a brief survey of ACMT currently installed on US Class I railroads including a 
discussion of the cost of implementation.  The cost of individual ACMT systems is provided in 
addition to the total investment in ACMT by the US railroad industry from 1993 to 2008.  
Finally, I provide preliminary discussions on the potential impacts of ACMT on safety and 
efficiency. 
 
Chapter 5: presented at the AREMA 2010 Annual Conference in Orlando, FL and published in 
the conference proceedings (Schlake et al. 2010b) 
In this chapter, I apply Lean Production methods to the railcar maintenance process and 
investigate potential means of eliminating waste and reducing variability through the 
implementation of ACMT.  I consider the potential impact on intermediate 1,000-mile unit-train 
inspections and quantify the direct and indirect delay costs resulting from railcar inspection.  
This analysis provides a basis for developing cost-effective inspection and maintenance 
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strategies using automated technologies and evaluates potential benefits in terms of improved 
efficiency and increased capacity. 
 
Chapter 6: presented in part at the 2010 JRC in Urbana, IL (Schlake et al. 2010) and the 
American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) Rail Transportation Division (RTD) Fall 
2010 Conference in Roanoke, VA, and submitted to the Transportation Research Record: 
Journal of the Transportation Research Board, Transportation Research Board of the National 
Academies in August of 2010 (Schlake et al. 2010c) 
 This chapter addresses the impact of railcar condition monitoring on railroad mainline 
efficiency.  I analyze results from dispatch simulation software to determine the impact of in-
service failures (ISFs) on mainline efficiency at varying traffic levels.  This analysis is used to 
estimate the train delay cost resulting from different lengths of equipment-related ISFs on both 
single-track and double-track routes.  Train delay is calculated by adding the primary delay (for 
the train containing a mechanical defect) and the secondary delay (for other trains in the network 
that incur delay due to the stoppage of the defective train).  Variability in train delay is also 
considered, as it is a fundamental source of operational waste.  This analysis provides a basis for 
the comparison of current railcar inspection practices with new integrated practices incorporating 
automated railcar condition monitoring systems. 
 
Chapter 7: Currently in press in the Proceedings of the Institution of Mechanical Engineers, Part 
F: Journal of Rail and Rapid Transit (JRRT) (Schlake et al. 2010d).  With the exception of the 
acknowledgements and references sections, the journal article is provided in its entirety 
including contributions by other authors. The article was adjusted to meet the formatting 
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requirements for this thesis and language was adapted from British to American English for 
consistency with the rest of this thesis. The abstract for this article is provided below. 
To ensure the safe and efficient operation of the approximately 1.6 million freight cars 
(wagons) in the North American railroad network, the United States Department of 
Transportation (US DOT) Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) requires periodic inspection of 
railcars to detect structural damage and defects.  Railcar structural underframe components, 
including the center sill, sidesills and crossbearers, are subject to fatigue cracking due to periodic 
and/or cyclic loading during service and other forms of damage.  The current railcar inspection 
process is time-consuming and relies heavily on the acuity, knowledge, skill and endurance of 
qualified inspection personnel to detect these defects.  Consequently, technologies are under 
development to automate critical inspection tasks to improve their efficiency and effectiveness.  
Research was conducted to determine the feasibility of inspecting railcar underframe 
components using machine vision technology.  A digital video system was developed to record 
images of railcar underframes and computer software was developed to identify components and 
assess their condition.  Tests of the image recording system were conducted at several railroad 
maintenance facilities.  The images collected there were used to develop several types of 
machine vision algorithms to analyze images of railcar underframes and assess the condition of 
certain structural components.  The results suggest that machine vision technology, in 
conjunction with other automated systems and preventive maintenance strategies, has the 
potential to provide comprehensive and objective information pertaining to railcar underframe 
component condition, thereby improving utilization of inspection and repair resources and 




CHAPTER 2: ROLLING STOCK SAFETY 
2.1  History of US Rolling Stock Safety 
 The first 80 years of United States (US) rail transportation were characterized by 
increasing numbers of employee fatalities and injuries.  As railroads, railcars, train size and 
speeds increased, so did the number of people injured, maimed and killed due to railroad 
incidents and accidents.  During the ten-year period of 1902 to 1911, over 33,000 employees and 
4,000 passengers were killed and over 400,000 employees and 110,000 passengers were injured 
(OTA 1978).  According to records kept by the Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen and 
Enginemen’s insurance fund, “From 1882 to 1912, 48 percent of all [member] deaths were from 
railroad accidents, in comparison to 7 percent from typhoid fever, the next largest cause.  Outside 
of wartime, never before had such large groups of individuals been subject to such fearsome 
risks from manmade causes” (Aldrich 2006).  In comparison to European railroads, US railroads 
assumed greater risks due to limited budgets and the desire to increase profits.  The US 
constructed track with sharp curvature and steep grades, placing greater physical demands on 
rolling stock.  Budget constraints also prevented US railroads from taking advantage of safer, 
more expensive technology.  For instance, when European railroads shifted to iron wheels with 
steel rims, US railroads continued to use the less durable cast iron wheels with a chilled rim.  
Additionally, in an effort to increase profits and take advantage of the economies of scale, 
railroads began to increase the size of railcars, often at the expense of safety.  Because of these 
decisions, US railroads appeared to value profit and speed over safety, and train derailments and 
employee injuries increased.  These changes led to widespread public concern and the eventual 
movement toward major safety initiatives within the railroad industry. 
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2.1.1  Early Rolling Stock Safety 
During the late 1800s, the US freight car industry experienced rapid growth.  The US 
rolling stock fleet increased from 300,000 freight cars in 1870 to approximately 1.3 million cars 
by 1900 (White 1993).   During this time, nominal car capacity also increased from 20,000 
pounds per car to over 80,000 pounds (Wellington 1887, United States Census Office 1902).  In 
the absence of industry-wide equipment standards, design specifications for railcar structural 
strength and running gear durability did not always coincide with the increases in lading 
capacity.  In addition, the interchange of foreign cars (i.e. cars from different railroads), which 
had begun at a national level around 1866, presented new problems.  It is estimated that by the 
1880s, 40 percent of the cars on any given railroad were foreign cars (White 1993).  Due to the 
economic structure of the interchange system, there were not always adequate incentives for 
railroads to repair foreign cars, which led to deferral of critical maintenance until cars reached 
their home railroad.  In addition, because freight car designs were constantly evolving, railroad 
workers were faced with the challenge of inspecting and repairing new and unique rolling stock 
on a continual basis.  As a result, railcars were often unreliable and unsafe: equipment-caused 





















Figure 2.1 Equipment-Caused Train Accident Rates from 1875 to 1899 (Aldrich 2006) 
 
2.1.2  Early Railroad Employee Safety 
In addition to equipment-caused derailments, the lack of uniform and consistent 
equipment standards led to unsafe working conditions for railroad employees.  By 1888, over 
6,000 US railroad employees were being killed annually due to coupler or handbrake-related 
accidents alone (ICC 1889).  Early freight car designs incorporated link and pin couplers, which 
required brakemen to work in-between moving freight cars, inserting their hand between the two 
couplers pockets and dropping the pin into the removable link.  This operation resulted in many 
severe injuries to railroad employees including the loss of fingers and hands, and in some cases 
death.  Additionally, differences in buffer block designs led to a large number of coupling deaths.  
Buffer blocks were a safety appliance used to protect the cars and brakemen from collision 
during coupling, and were located above the coupler or, in some cases, on either side of the 
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coupler.  If the two cars being coupled had different drawbar heights or buffer block designs, the 
brakemen could be crushed.  
In addition to coupling, train braking was another significant source of employee injuries 
and deaths.  Early train brake technology used manual hand brakes that required members of the 
train crew, called brakemen, to traverse the top of a moving train and individually apply the hand 
brakes on each car.  The lack of equipment standards impeded the work of these early brakemen, 
leading to thousands of injuries and deaths:  
“Under the very best conditions stopping a freight train was a hazardous 
occupation.  Under adverse ones it was almost a case of predictable injury or 
death.  The basic problem was the lack of uniformity in freight 
equipment…Under these circumstances it is not too hard to understand why 
brakemen stumbled and fell between cars or were thrown off heavily swaying 
freight cars rounding curves or bouncing over rough tracks. As if this were not 
enough, overhead bridges added another hazard.  For the men who did not get 
down between the cars fast enough or duck in time a bump on the head would 
knock them off the train” (Clark 1966).  
 
As a result of these hazards, new technologies were developed to improve safety and 
prevent injuries and deaths due to train braking and coupling.  Two major inventions that 
eventually became industry standards were the Janney automatic coupler and the Westinghouse 
automatic air brake. 
The Janney or “knuckle” coupler allowed cars to be coupled without requiring a 
brakeman to stand between the cars during coupling.  Despite its obvious safety benefits, the 
automatic coupler was not immediately adopted by the railroads.  According to Wellington 
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(1887), the main obstacle to the introduction of the automatic coupler was its lack of reverse 
compatibility: “owing to the continuous interchange of cars no real benefit would be derived 
from such a coupler until it had come into almost universal use.”  Wellington correctly predicted 
that complete adoption of the automatic coupler would not be achieved until the end of the 19th 
Century (Aldrich 2006). 
Similar to the process of adopting the automatic coupler, the standardization of train 
braking systems was delayed despite obvious and significant safety benefits.  The Westinghouse 
air brake system used compressed air to apply the brake shoes to the wheels of each car.  With 
this technology, the brakemen no longer needed to traverse a moving train to individually apply 
the brakes on each car.  However, due to initial uncertainty regarding the reliability of air brakes 
and the high costs required for railroads to retrofit their rolling stock, this technology was not 
immediately adopted by the industry.  The improvement of railroad worker safety through 
prevention of coupler and braking accidents would ultimately require an act of Congress. 
2.1.3  Early Equipment Safety Initiatives 
By the end of the 19th century, public concern began to rise for equipment-related railroad 
safety, eventually leading the US government to implement changes within the industry.  
Through the advocacy of Lorenzo S. Coffin of the Iowa Railroad Commission, support from the 
Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC), and encouragement from President Benjamin Harrison, 
Congress passed the Safety Appliance Act in 1893 (ICC 1893).  The Safety Appliance Act 
required the use of automatic couplers and air brakes as well as secure grab irons (e.g. 
handholds) on cars (ICC 1893, Edwards 2006).  Although the implementation of standards was 
not immediate, statistics presented by the National Association of Railway Commissioners 
(NARC 1909) suggests that by the early 1900s railroad employee safety began to improve.  Prior 
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to the Safety Appliance Act, 44 percent of all railroad employee injuries and fatalities occurred 
during coupling operations.  Nearly fifteen years later, in 1908, that number had been reduced to 
only 8 percent (NARC 1909). Although an increase in injuries and fatalities due to other causes 
may have contributed to the decline in the percentage due to coupling accidents, this reduction is 
consistent with an improvement in safety due to changes resulting from the Safety Appliance 
Act. To better evaluate the effectiveness of early railcar and employee safety measures, the 
Accident Reports Act was signed into law by President William Taft in 1910 (NRHS 2006).  The 
1910 Accident Reports Act required railroads to report all accidents involving injury or property 
damage and gave the ICC authority to investigate serious railroad accidents.  The framework for 
data collection resulting from this Act provided the groundwork for what would become the FRA 
Office of Safety Analysis database.  
 The reduction in employee injuries and fatalities that took place after the passage of the 
Safety Appliance Act provided motivation for the ICC to pursue additional regulation to promote 
railroad employee safety.  As a result of safety appliance inspections by the ICC, additional 
railcar component defects, beyond those included in the original Act, were identified to be safety 
hazards.  These findings led to various safety initiatives, including the passage of the Safety 
Appliance Act of 1910.  This Act required specification of number, dimensions, location, and 
manner of application for ladders, roof handholds, hand brakes, running boards, and all safety 
appliances named in the 1893 Act (ICC 1909, Edwards 2006).  To develop these specifications, 
the ICC created the Division of Safety Appliances in 1911 and issued orders for the application 
of the 1910 Act.  These orders would eventually form the basis for the FRA Railroad Safety 
Appliance Standards.  
 Beyond the efforts of the government, Class I railroads also began to take responsibility 
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for employee safety.  The Safety First program was initiated by the Chicago and North Western 
Railway in 1910, and by 1918, all Class I railroads were required by the government to adopt 
similar safety programs.  As a result of these programs and the regulations of the early 1900s, 
employee injury rates fell by 75 percent from 1920 to 1940 (Savage 1998).  Subsequent to these 
improvements, there were no major government enactments concerning rolling stock safety until 
the later half of the 20th century (Figure 2.2). 
 
Figure 2.2 Timeline of US Government Enactments Related to Rolling Stock Safety 
 
2.1.4  Middle 20th Century Equipment Safety Initiatives 
Between 1910 and 1960 accident rates improved considerably.  As a result, Congress did 
not pass any freight-car safety-related legislation until the 1958 amendment to the 1910 Safety 
Appliance Act.  This amendment required the adoption of the AAR’s rules for inspection, 
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maintenance, and testing of power brakes (OTA 1978).  In 1960, an amendment to the Accident 
Reports Act was passed, leading to a revision of the requirements for train accident reporting.  
Considering the past achievements in safety, the decline in passenger service, and rapid increase 
in freight service, new safety regulation did not appear imminent in the 1960s.  However, 
economic challenges and the resulting deferred maintenance of the 1960s and 1970s led to a new 
phase of government intervention. 
The safety improvements of the first half of the 20th century regressed during the 1960s.  
From 1960 to 1970, railroad employee injuries and fatalities increased 75 percent and 16 percent, 
respectively (Savage 1998).  By 1975, US Class I railroads had deferred approximately $6.6 
billion in maintenance (OTA 1978).  Meanwhile, the average tons per carload had increased 43 
percent from 42.5 tons in 1955 to 60.8 tons in 1975 (AAR 2008).  This combination of 
insufficient track maintenance and increased axle loads resulted in a sharp rise in track-caused 
accidents.  Although equipment-caused accident rates were not increasing during this time, 
rolling stock maintenance was still a concern of railroad managers and government regulators. 
 When the Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) was created in 1967, it assumed the 
powers of the ICC Bureau of Railroad Safety, including track and equipment regulation and 
inspection.  One of the FRA’s first initiatives was the development and issuance of the Railroad 
Safety Appliance Standards.  Several years later, in accordance with the Federal Railroad Safety 
Act of 1970, the FRA issued the Railroad Freight Car Safety Standards, which went into effect 
on January 1, 1974.  These FRA standards, and the power brake regulations which were 
substantially revised through the Rail Safety Enforcement and Review Act of 1992, provide 
regulatory guidance for all freight car inspection activities currently performed by Class I 
railroads. 
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2.1.5  Recent Equipment Safety Initiatives 
In recent decades, the railroad industry has become one of the safest industries in the US, 
with train-accident and employee-injury rates reaching record minima in 2009.  From 1980 to 
2009, the number of train accidents per million train miles fell 76 percent and the number of 
railroad employee injuries per 200,000 employee-hours decreased 82 percent (AAR 2010).  After 
the passage of the Staggers Act in 1980, railroad revenue rose significantly and capital funds 
became available for investment in infrastructure and rolling stock improvements that increased 
both safety and efficiency (Gallamore 1999).  By the 1990s, the economic vitality of the U.S. 
freight railroad industry was returning.  In their quest for further improvements in safety and 
efficiency, they began developing and investing in a variety of new technologies (Robert et al. 
2009).  Among these were automated condition monitoring technologies (ACMT).  These 
technological innovations led to the beginning of a new phase of rolling stock safety by 
providing the capability to automatically identify freight car defects and maintain detailed 
records of freight car component condition.  The following analysis considers the safety 
improvements that have occurred during the initial period of ACMT development and 
implementation (1990s to 2000s).  This analysis also quantifies potential failure costs that may 
be mitigated through increased improvements to railcar inspection and maintenance practices.  I 
provide a more detailed background and discussion of ACMT in Chapter 4. 
2.2  Analysis of Equipment-Related Safety Data 
 Since the ICC began collecting train accident data in 1901, there have been several shifts 
in the federal government’s interest in railroad safety.  In the first half of the 20th century, the 
primary safety goal was the reduction of injuries and fatalities to both passengers and employees.  
Highway and air became the dominant modes of intercity passenger transportation in the 1950s 
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and 1960s.  Consequently, railroad passenger injuries and fatalities declined, and attention 
shifted to grade-crossing safety.  In addition, railroad employment declined, resulting in fewer 
total employee injuries and fatalities.  From 1929 to 1978, railroad employment decreased by 
approximately 71 percent and total person-hours decreased by approximately 79 percent (OTA 
1978).  According to the US Office of Technology Assessment (OTA), these changes, in 
addition to the shift away from passenger service and toward freight transportation, led to a 
greater emphasis on the safety of property (e.g. track infrastructure, locomotives, freight cars and 
lading) as opposed to the safety of people.  Rolling stock maintenance directly affects the safety 
of both people and property, and while large improvements have been made to the former, there 
still remain opportunities to improve the latter. 
2.2.1  Safety of People 
 As a result of the safety initiatives of the early 20th century, equipment-caused injuries 
and fatalities are rare.  During the ten-year period of 1999 to 2008, there were no equipment-
caused fatalities and only 49 injuries among the four largest US Class I railroads (BNSF, CSX, 
NS and UP).  During this same interval these four railroads accumulated approximately 4.9 
billion train miles and over 3.0 billion employee hours resulting in rates of 0.010 injuries per 
million train mile and 0.003 injuries per 200,000 employee hours, respectively (AAR 2008b).  
Also of note is the fact that 22 of these injuries were due to a single derailment caused by a 
wheel defect in 2007.  These data indicate that the safety initiatives to-date have substantially 
reduced the likelihood of equipment-caused accidents, and the consequent risk to human life. 
2.2.2  Safety of Property 
Train accidents must be reported to the FRA when a fatality or serious bodily injury 
occurs, or when monetary damages to track and equipment surpass a FRA-maintained threshold 
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(set at $9,200 in 2009, US DOT 2009).  When an FRA reportable accident occurs, railroad 
personnel must determine the cause of the accident and record a number of specific details 
regarding the circumstances of the accident.  Among these are the number of cars derailed, the 
number of injuries and fatalities, and the number of hazardous materials cars involved in the 
accident.  In some cases, the cause of the accident is attributed to mechanical or electrical 
component failure and the FRA categorizes the accident in Group E for Equipment.  Over the 
period of 1999 to 2008, the four largest US Class I railroads had a total of 1,343 equipment-
caused (Group E), mainline derailments attributed to defective railcar components.  These 
resulted in approximately $350 million in track and equipment damages (US DOT 2009).  
Analysis of these data shows a linear decrease in the number of equipment-related mainline 



















Figure 2.3 Railcar Equipment-Caused Train Accident Rates from 1999-2008  
(Left Axis) Compared to Traffic Volume (Right Axis) (US DOT 2009) 
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While traffic volume increased from approximately 31 billion freight car miles (BFCM) 
in 1999 to approximately 35 BFCM in 2008, mainline derailment rates due to railcar defects 
declined by about one derailment per BFCM, or approximately 38 percent.  This decline in 
derailment rates is a result of many factors, some of which may include improvements to railcar 
maintenance capabilities afforded by ACMT, track maintenance practices, and railcar component 
design.  As will be discussed further in Chapter 4, North American Railroads invested heavily in 
ACMT during the 2000s, and as a result, the implementation of ACMT probably played a role in 
reducing derailment rates.  An analysis conducted by Robert et al. (2009) estimated that US 
Class I railroads have saved approximately $227 million through 2008 due to the implementation 
of ACMT.  As concluded in their study:  
 “While the benefits of wayside detectors versus concurrent improvements 
in track and railcar technology and maintenance practices may be open to 
discussion, it is clear that there have been reductions in inflation-adjusted costs 
per train mile from broken wheel, broken rail, overload and imbalanced load, 
bearing-related, brake-related, and truck-related accidents.” 
According to analysis using the FRA Accident Database, from 1999 to 2008, equipment-
caused derailments resulted in an average of approximately $38.4 million in track and equipment 
damages on the four largest US Class I railroads (US DOT 2009).  Mainline derailments 
accounted for approximately $35 million, while non-mainline derailments accounted for 
approximately $3.4 million in total damages (US DOT 2009) (Figure 2.4a).  Over this time 
period, approximately 78% of all damages resulted from three types of component failures: 
wheels, journal bearings, and truck components.  Compared to the 10-year average, derailment 











































Figure 2.4 Track and Equipment Damages from Equipment-Caused  
Derailments; Ten-Year Annual Averages 1999-2008 (a) and 2008 Data (b) (US DOT 2009) 
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In 2008, the damage costs for equipment-caused derailments on the four largest US Class 
I railroads were approximately $33 million (Figure 2.4b).  Although costs due to wheel defects 
were close to the 10-year average, the costs due to defective journal bearings and truck 
components were much lower in 2008 than the average.  These differences may be a result of 
improved preventive maintenance strategies aimed at reducing these types of defects. 
There are key differences between mainline and non-mainline derailments.  A large 
portion of 2008 derailments caused by defective truck components or coupler and draft system 
defects occurred on non-mainline track.  Conversely, all axle and journal bearing-related 
derailments and most wheel and brake-related derailments occurred on mainline track.  Since 
mainline track speeds are typically higher than those on non-mainline track, these data indicate 
that defective wheels, axles, journal bearings, and brakes may be more prone to causing 
derailments at higher speeds.  These data also indicate that the risk associated with some railcar 
components may be higher than others.  
2.3 Risk-Based Analysis of Mainline Derailment Causes 
An analysis was performed to determine which railcar component failures pose the 
greatest risk of causing a derailment.  Risk is often defined as the product of frequency (or 
probability) and consequence (Glickman and Gough 1990).  Since more derailments occur on 
mainline tracks than non-mainlines and because repair costs and train delay costs are both higher 
on mainlines, the associated risk is greater.  As a result, only mainline data for equipment-caused 
derailments were used in this analysis.  Using data from 1999 to 2008 for the four largest US 
Class I railroads, I plotted consequence (i.e. the average number of cars derailed per derailment) 
versus frequency (i.e. the average number of equipment-caused derailments per year) (Figure 2.5 
and Table 2.1).  This analysis indicates that wheels, journal bearings and truck components 
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represent the causes that pose the greatest risk for equipment-caused mainline derailments.  The 
derailment consequence for other component defects is close to the average but the frequency is 
























Figure 2.5 Derailment Risk Associated with Various Railcar Component Failures on Mainlines for 
the Four Largest US Class I Railroads, 1999-2008 (US DOT 2009) 
 
 
Table 2.1 Average Annual Derailment Statistics for the Four Largest US Class I Railroads From 
1999-2008 (US DOT 2009) 
 
 *BFCM = Billion Freight Car Miles 
Focusing on the three mainline derailment causes representing the greatest risk, data were 




































Figure 2.6 Car Derailment Rates (Per Billion Freight Car Mile) Associated with Wheel Failures (a) 
Journal Bearing Failures (b) and Truck Component Failures (c) for the Four Largest US Class I 
Railroads; 1999-2008 (US DOT 2009) 
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While the risk associated with wheel failures does not display a strong trend from 1999 to 
2008, the linear relationships for journal bearing and truck component data are stronger.  Despite 
exceptions in 2004 for journal bearings and in 2002 and 2003 for truck components, the data 
show linear decreases for both failure types over the ten-year period.  These decreases in 
derailment risk during the 2000s may be the result of a variety of factors: new component 
designs and materials, improved maintenance strategies focused on preventing derailments, and 
new wayside detection systems designed to identify journal bearing and truck component 
defects.  The extent to which wayside detection technology has contributed to reduced 
derailment risk will be discussed further in Chapter 4. 
To assess the degree to which track and equipment damages can be used as a proxy for 
derailment risk, I compared the average annual derailment costs with the associated car 
derailment rates for each failure cause.  Annual damage costs appear to parallel annual car 
derailment rates for equipment-caused mainline derailments (Figure 2.7).  As shown in the 
previous analysis, failures involving wheels, journal bearings and truck components have the 
greatest consequences among equipment-caused derailments.  However, since damage costs are 
sensitive to steel prices and other outside factors, they may be a less reliable proxy for the 
physical consequences of derailment risk.  For the more common derailment causes (e.g. wheels, 
journal bearings, and truck components) the risk metrics correlate well with derailment costs.  
However, for the derailment causes that are less frequent, there are fewer data points, so there is 


































Figure 2.7 Comparison of Average Car Derailment Rates (per Billion Freight Car Mile) and Average 
Annual Track and Equipment-Damages for Various Derailment Causes on the Four Largest US 
Class I Railroads,1999-2008 (US DOT 2009) 
 
2.4  Conclusions 
Through the implementation of new technologies and maintenance practices, equipment-
related railroad safety improved considerably during the 20th century.  Critical advancements in 
federal safety legislation and regulation, railcar design, and inspection technology have led to the 
reduction of equipment-caused train derailments and have nearly eliminated employee injuries 
and fatalities due to these causes.  Analysis of FRA accident data for the period 1999 to 2008 
found that the four largest US Class I railroads spent an average of about $38 million per year on 
equipment-caused mainline derailments.  This is a conservative estimate, as it does not include 
environmental clean-up costs or litigation.  However, this value does provide a reasonable basis 
to quantify the magnitude of failure costs (e.g. track and equipment damages) that may be 
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reduced through the safety improvements afforded by ACMT. 
Among all railcar components, wheels, journal bearings and truck components represent 
the greatest derailment risk and result in approximately 78% of all equipment-caused derailment 
costs.  Although car derailment rates decreased for all three types of component failure from 
1999 to 2008, wheel-caused derailment rates did not decline as much as the other two causes.  
Thus, the greatest current potential cost savings may result from improved wheel maintenance 
strategies.   
Given projections of increased traffic levels over the next several decades, railcar 
maintenance will continue to be a priority in order to realize the benefits of improved safety and 
efficiency.  As technology and data acquisition allow for enhanced condition monitoring of 
railcar components, the risk of equipment-caused derailments can be further reduced.  In order to 
realize these benefits, however, an assessment must be made of the current railcar inspection 
process to identify areas of potential improvement and determine the extent to which automated 














CHAPTER 3: CURRENT RAILCAR INSPECTION PRACTICES 
3.1  Railcar Inspection History 
Beginning in the mid-1800s, US railroads started employing individuals for the specific 
purpose of railcar inspection.  Although there is little historic documentation regarding the 
introduction of the car inspector, by 1884, the role and value of their job was well understood 
within the industry: 
The railroads are more appreciative of his duties than in years gone by, and the 
best-managed roads are as careful in their appointment of car inspectors as in the 
selection of train dispatchers. If either makes a mistake it is irreparable and fatal  
(Railway Gazette 1884). 
 
During the latter half of the 19th century, railroad technology was developing rapidly, but 
the service-life of railcar components was still short.  As a result, equipment defects were 
common, placing a large burden on car inspectors.  Since recommended inspection practices had 
not yet been developed, inspectors relied heavily on their physical ability, mental acuity and 
knowledge of railcar components. 
To perform their duties, car inspectors relied mainly on visual inspection, but at times 
required the use of various pieces of equipment.  Several tools of the trade included a hammer to 
“sound out” cracked or broken wheels, a piece of chalk or other marking device to identify cars 
with possible defects, and a lantern for inspecting trains at night (Railway Gazette 1884 and 
1903).  In 1908, to ensure that a car inspector’s experience would be retained and passed on to 
new employees, the American Railway Association adopted recommended practices for the 
selection and instruction of apprentices (Wright 1922).  Although formal apprenticeship 
programs were eventually replaced by newer training methods, the practice of manual inspection 
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based primarily on experience and on-the-job training has continued to the present time.  
3.2  Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) Inspection Requirements 
United States Department of Transportation (US DOT) Federal Railroad Administration 
(FRA) regulations require that every car placed in the train must receive a mechanical inspection 
before the train departs from a yard or terminal (US DOT 2010).  In addition, trains travelling 
long distances must be stopped for inspection after 1,000 miles, but are allowed to travel up to 
3,500 miles between inspections if special conditions are met.  When a train is initially inspected 
after being assembled in a classification yard or terminal, the inspection is referred to as an initial 
terminal, or Class I inspection, whereas 1,000-mile intermediate inspections are referred to as 
Class IA inspections.  Each railroad has developed car inspection rules and company policies in 
order to comply with FRA requirements.  Given that the railroad is in compliance with all FRA 
requirements, the specific application of the rules can vary slightly among railroads.  For 
example, as a result of the 1,000-mile inspection requirement, some railroads have designed and 
constructed special inspection terminals at strategic locations along their primary corridors (e.g. 
the BNSF inspection terminals at Belen, NM and Alliance, NE).  Regardless of the location, 
however, each railroad must supply the FRA with a list of all designated locations where Class 
IA inspections are performed. 
FRA-mandated safety compliance inspection of freight cars must only be performed by 
persons designated by a railroad as being qualified to inspect freight cars for compliance with 
FRA rules and regulations (REB 1996).  Car inspectors, referred to as carmen, must demonstrate 
proficiency in the inspection requirements given in the Code of Federal Relations (CFR) Title 49 
(Transportation), Parts 215 (Railroad Freight Car Safety Standards), 231 (Railroad Safety 
Appliance Standards), and 232 (Brake System Safety Standards).  Current FRA inspection rules 
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are designed to facilitate preventive maintenance by removing defective equipment prior to a 
derailment or in-service failure.  However, based on current inspection practices, the degree to 
which preventive maintenance can be performed is heavily dependant on the effectiveness of car 
inspection personnel.  
3.3 Association of American Railroad (AAR) Interchange Rules 
 In addition to FRA requirements, all railroads that exchange cars in unrestricted 
interchange must abide by the AAR Interchange Rules.  These rules govern the fair and proper 
handling of foreign and private freight cars and apply to the inspection, repair, and disposition of 
such cars.  Foreign freight cars are those being transported by any railroad other than the owner.  
Private freight cars are ones that are owned by companies other than a railroad (e.g. General 
Electric Railcar Services Corp., Trinity Industries Leasing Companies Inc., First Union Rail 
Leasing Co., GATX Rail Corp., and Union Tank Car Co.).  In April of 2010, approximately 12% 
of cars on US Class I railroad lines were foreign and approximately 58% were privately owned 
(AAR 2010c).  Since over 70% of the freight cars on US Class I railroads are not owned by the 
handling railroad, maintaining uniform standards for car inspection and repair is critical to the 
safety and efficiency of the US railroad system.  
3.4  Class I Railroad Unit Train Inspection Practices 
To develop an understanding of current railcar inspection practices, a field survey of 
inspection practices was conducted on multiple railroads (NS, CN, CP, Belt Railway of Chicago, 
BNSF, Union Pacific, and CSX) during the period of July 2008 to October 2009.  The focus of 
this survey was the manual (FRA compliance) inspection of unit trains (i.e. those that remain as a 
single consist from origin to destination, often containing cars with the same type of lading).  
Unit trains were chosen because they represent traffic that generates among the highest total 
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revenues and car utilization rates (e.g. coal and intermodal).  In addition, initial ACMT 
applications, especially machine vision technology, will be most applicable to the inspection of 
unit trains due to the uniformity in car design. 
Although some inspection practices vary slightly among railroads or locations, the 
general procedure performed by car inspectors remains relatively consistent among US Class I 
railroads.  This procedure can be divided into seven distinct steps: 1) secure track protection, 2) 
inspect train, 3) make necessary minor repairs and/or identify bad-order cars, 4) perform air test, 
5) release brakes, 6) verify brake release, 7) remove track protection.  With the exception of step 
6, all of these steps apply to both Class I and Class IA inspections.  
3.4.1  Secure Track Protection 
When a train enters a railyard or terminal, it is typically stopped on a receiving track 
where the train crew sets the hand brakes on a portion of the cars and detaches the locomotive(s).  
Either two, or in some cases four, carmen are then assigned to inspect the train.  Before 
approaching the train, the carmen must contact the yard office and secure track protection to 
ensure that the cars will not be moved or coupled to while performing the train inspection.  This 
is referred to as obtaining “blue-flag,” or “blue-signal,” protection and requires the placement of 
a blue-colored marker either directly adjacent to, or in-between the gauge of the track (Figure 
3.1a).  To ensure complete protection, a blue-flag must be placed both in front of and behind the 
train being inspected.  In some cases, a blue marker is also placed on the locomotive to provide 
an indication to the train crew that blue-flag protection has been secured (Figure 3.1b).  As 
another measure of precaution, the inspection track is typically protected through the use of 
derails or by throwing switches in front and behind the stopped train.  A derail is a special device 
that is placed on the rail to prevent rolling stock from moving beyond a specified location, and 
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designed to derail cars that roll over the device (Figure 3.1c).  The derail shown in Figure 3.1c 
can be locked from outside the track (where the blue flag is located) so that carmen do not need 
to foul the track when locking or unlocking the derail. 
       
 







Figure 3.1 Class I Railroad Blue-Flag Protection Equipment Including  
Flag (a), Locomotive Marker (b), and Derail (c) 
 
3.4.2  Inspect Train 
Current railcar inspection practices require carmen to walk or ride a vehicle along the 
entire length of a train, visually inspecting the mechanical components on both sides of each car.  
In most cases, two carmen are assigned to each train so that one can inspect each side of the 
train.  In this case, the two carmen can either start at different ends of the train (Yard A, Figure 
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3.2) or they can start on the same side and walk in parallel on either side of the train.  In other 
instances, four carmen are assigned to a single train, each one inspecting one quarter of the cars 
















Figure 3.2 Example Inspection Arrangements for Class I Railroad Train Inspections  
(Edwards 2006) 
 
Using additional carmen, as shown in Yard B, reduces the time the train is required to 
wait for an inspection, but the total labor time (i.e. person hours) remains constant.  As a result, 
to avoid requiring carmen to climb in-between the cars during an inspection, Class I railroads 
typically use the arrangement shown for Yard A. 
When performing train inspections, carmen on different railroads use various modes of 
transportation.  For smaller yards that perform few train inspections or in yards with narrow track 
spacing on the inspection tracks, carmen perform inspections on foot (Figure 3.3a and 3.3b).  If 
the track spacing allows, many railroads provide motorized vehicles for carmen to use, shown in 
3.3c and 3.3e.  Vehicles allow carmen to move at a faster rate and can assist in the prevention of 
slips, trips, and falls.  In addition, repair equipment can be carried in the rear of the vehicle 
including tools and spare parts (e.g. brake shoes, air hoses, knuckle pins, etc.).  Smaller vehicles 
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(Figure 3.3c) are more common, but in some cases track spacing is large enough to allow the use 
of full-size pickup trucks during inspections (Figure 3.3e and Figure 3.3f).  
 









       
 
(e) (f)  
 
Figure 3.3 Modes of Transportation for Carmen During Train Inspections (a, c and e) and 




Using a larger vehicle can be advantageous because more equipment can be carried and 
carmen can perform more extensive repairs, reducing the number of cars that must be sent to a 
repair track or facility.  During inspections, carmen operate inspection vehicles at low speeds to 
allow adequate inspection time and reduce the likelihood of an accident.  From within the vehicle 
(3.3d and 3.3f), a carmen can detect major defects, such as broken and missing components.  
However, when a carmen identifies something that requires closer examination, they typically 
stop their inspection vehicle and step out to attain a better view of the potential defect. 
Although most of the inspection is performed visually, carmen are sometimes required to 
physically handle components, to test for loose bolts, broken seals, etc.  Physical contact is also 
necessary if a wheel appears to be worn, or defective.  Using a handheld wheel gauge (Figure 
3.4), carmen can determine if a wheel has a high or thin flange, a thin rim, condemnable flat 
spots (i.e. slid flats), or condemnable chips or gouges.  AAR requirements for wheel profile 
limits are more restrictive than those required by the FRA.  As a result, wheel gauges are used 
differently depending on the type of inspection and where the car is located.  For example, in 
Figure 3.4a, the carmen is inspecting for an AAR defect, that would not apply to an FRA safety 
inspection.   





Figure 3.4 Carmen Inspecting Wheels for Shelled Tread (A) and Thin Flange (B) 
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According to AAR Rule 41, “Whenever any shell or spall is 1 inch or more in diameter, 
the wheel must be removed from service” (AAR 2010d).  As shown in Figure 3.4a, the shelled 
spot is not yet 1 inch in diameter, so this wheel would not be condemnable under AAR rules.  
However, even if the shelled spot had been large enough to be condemnable under AAR rules, 
the wheel would not be condemnable during an FRA Class IA inspection.  According to the FRA 
wheel inspection requirements (CFR 215.103), a single shelled spot must be more than 2.5 
inches in length in order to be condemnable.  There are also differences in allowable wheel 
profile tolerances between the AAR and FRA rules.  Carmen must therefore be very familiar 
with the use of a wheel gauge in order to avoid mistakes.  They must also be aware of the 
inspection requirements based on their location.  Cars that have been set-out on a repair track are 
subject to AAR inspection rules, while on receiving tracks, or run-through tracks, only FRA 
inspection limits need apply. 
3.4.3  Minor Repairs and Bad-Ordering Cars 
In a typical car inspection, carmen may identify several cars in a train that require repair.  
Relatively minor defects can often be immediately rectified by the carmen using tools and 
supplies that are contained in their inspection vehicle.  One example of a common minor repair is 
a worn brake shoe.  Using a graduated pry-bar or other applicable tool, a carmen can easily 




         
(a) (b) 
 
Figure 3.5 Wheel with Missing Brake Shoe (a) and Carmen Replacing Brake Shoe (b) 
 
For more serious defects, if the carmen does not have the necessary replacement part or 
equipment to make the repair, they can either request assistance from a maintenance vehicle or 
“bad order” the car.  Major defects that cannot be repaired on the inspection track must be bad 
ordered, meaning that the carmen must complete a Bad Order Card (Form-B) (Figure 3.6) and 
attach one to each side of the car.  This card indicates that the car must be separated from the 
train and set-out for repair before the train leaves the yard.  Common examples of bad-order 
defects include: wheelsets requiring replacement, broken safety appliances, a broken sidesill, or a 






























Figure 3.6 Bad Order Card (Form-B) for Sample Class I Railroad (Edwards 2006) 
 
3.4.4  Perform Air Test 
 An important aspect of every car inspection is the air test.  For unit trains undergoing 
intermediate inspections, the air test occurs immediately after inspecting the mechanical 
components.  This process is different for manifest trains since the cars in these types of trains 
are going to be classified at the yard they are arriving in (i.e. separated and assigned to different 
departing trains).  As a result, these trains receive an inbound mechanical inspection to identify 
bad order cars prior to classification and then an outbound pre-departure inspection that includes 
the air test.  For Class I inspections, 100% of the cars in a train must have operable brakes prior 
to leaving a yard or terminal.  Therefore, if the carmen or repair personnel cannot repair a serious 
air leak on a car, that car must be bad-ordered.  For Class IA inspections, only 85% of the cars 
must have operative and effective brakes.  The FRA requirements for both tests (CFR 
232.205(c)(1)) state that, “brake pipe leakage shall not exceed 5 psi per minute or air flow shall 
not exceed 60 cubic feet per minute” (CFM) (US DOT 2010).  To meet this requirement, carmen 
can either perform a Leakage Test or an Air-Flow Method Test. 
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The Leakage Test involves charging the air brake system to the pressure at which the 
train will be operated (greater than 75 pounds per square inch, or psi).  After making a 20-psi 
brake-pipe service reduction, and waiting 45-60 seconds, the brake-pipe leakage must not exceed 
5 psi per minute.  This test can be performed with the aid of an electronic end-of-train (EOT) 
device (Figure 3.7a) or using an analog gauge (Figure 3.7b). 




Figure 3.7 Carmen Performing Brake Test (a) and Analog Brake-Pipe Gauge (b) 
 
When using the EOT to perform the air test, the locomotive(s) must be attached at the 
head-end of the train and either a member of the train crew or another carmen must be present in 
the locomotive to approve the initiation of the air test and to confirm that the test was successful.  
If the train fails the leakage test, the train must be charged to the pressure at which the train will 
be operated and carmen must examine the train for leaks and make necessary repairs or set-outs. 
An alternative train line continuity test is the Air Flow Method (AFM) Test.  This test can 
only be performed if the locomotive is equipped with a 26-L brake valve or equivalent pressure 
maintaining locomotive brake valve.  For this test, the air brake system is charged to the pressure 
at which the train will be operated (and no greater than 75 psi) and the air flow is measured by a 
calibrated AFM indicator.  To pass this test, the air flow must not exceed 60 CFM.  
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3.4.5  Release Brakes and Recharge 
 After the successful completion of the air test, the brakes are then released (i.e. the brake 
shoes are disengaged from the wheel treads).  If a Leakage Test was performed, the brake system 
must be recharged to the appropriate pressure.  If still attached to the head-end of the train, the 
locomotive(s) can be used to recharge the train.  Otherwise, the cut of cars must be recharged 
using yard air (Figure 3.8).  If a cut of cars remains off air for a period of more than four hours, 
FRA regulations (CFR 232.205(a)(3)) require that it must receive another Class I inspection.  
 
       
 
(a) (b)  
 
Figure 3.8 Carmen Recharging Air Brake System (a) and Yard Air Apparatus (b) 
 
3.4.6  Verify Brake Release (Only for Class I Inspections) 
If carmen are performing a Class I inspection, they must verify that the brakes have 
released on each car.  This can be done by walking or riding a vehicle along the length of the 
train.  When the brakes are released, the brake piston is extended (Figure 3.9a).  When traveling 
in a vehicle, the brake piston can often be difficult to see (Figure 3.9b), so carmen must know the 
exact location of the brake piston on each car.  As an additional means of verification, carmen 
also inspect the brake shoes on each car, to determine whether they have disengaged from the 
wheels. 
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(a) (b)  
 
Figure 3.9 Extended Brake Piston (a) and View of Piston from Inspection Vehicle (b) 
 
 
An alternative method of verifying brake release is by a “roll-by” inspection.  In a roll-by 
inspection, a qualified car inspector is positioned adjacent to the tracks and visually inspects each 
car as the train passes at no more than 10 mph.  Although the verification of brake release is 
required for Class I inspections only, carmen performing Class IA inspections often verify brake 
release as an additional safety precaution. 
3.4.7  Remove Blue-Flag Protection and Unlock Track 
 The final step of freight car inspection is to remove blue-flag protection and unlock and 
remove the derails at both ends of the train (Figure 3.10).   
 
Figure 3.10 Carmen Removing Blue Flag Protection  
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If switches were used in lieu of a derail, the switch must be restored to its normal 
position.  The switch for the track may be a considerable distance from the train, requiring the 
carmen to take additional time to walk or ride to the switch location.  Once blue-flag protection 
has been removed and the track has been unlocked, the carmen notifies the train crew and 
yardmaster that it has passed the mechanical inspection and can depart the terminal. 
3.5  Railcar Inspection Accuracy    
 Determining the accuracy of manual railcar inspection presents several challenges.  These 
data have rarely been collected and field-testing may be difficult due to labor stipulations.  One 
potential source is the FRA inspection database.  FRA motive power and equipment (MP&E) 
inspectors make periodic visits to rail terminals to ensure that each railroad complies with FRA 
inspection protocol.  FRA MP&E personnel often inspect trains directly after they have been 
inspected by railroad carmen to determine whether any mechanical defects have been 
overlooked.  FRA inspection data from 1998-2007 indicate that FRA MP&E inspectors detected 
an average of 0.027 defects per car (or 1.87 defects per train) over this time period (Table 3.1). 
 









If an inspection by an FRA MP&E inspector is assumed to be a “perfect inspection,” then 
an estimate for manual inspection accuracy could be determined by dividing the total number of 
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component defects identified by FRA MP&E inspectors by the sum of all defects identified by 
both FRA MP&E inspectors and railroad carmen.  In other words, this is the number of defects 
missed by railroad carmen out of the total number of detectable defects. The inverse of this value 
would be equivalent to the correct identification rate for railroad carmen.  Assuming that the 
false alarm rate for manual inspection is negligible, the correct identification rate can be 
considered to be equivalent to the inspection accuracy.  Since inspection records are not often 
kept by the railroads for manual railcar inspections, there are insufficient data to determine 
manual inspection accuracy. 
 When compared to manual inspection, ACMT has the potential for higher inspection 
accuracies.  Rail industry studies suggest that automated systems are capable of accuracies 
ranging between 90% and 99% (Steets and Tse 1998, Morgan 2002, Morgan and Gerald 2003).  
Machine vision inspection systems generally claim accuracies up to 90%, whereas WILD 
systems and wheel profile inspection systems have accuracies as high as 99%.  These accuracy 
estimates have not been formally validated, however, and ACMT systems from various vendors 
may offer a wide range of accuracies.  As this technology develops and additional data are 









CHAPTER 4: AUTOMATED CONDITION MONITORING TECHNOLOGY 
4.1   Wayside Detector Background  
Manual railcar inspections can vary in their efficiency and effectiveness depending on the 
particular experience or ability of individual car inspectors.  As a result, a train may be inspected 
to the best ability of a particular car inspector yet defects may be missed due to limitations in 
their ability or the conditions of the inspection.  Recognizing the inherent inefficiency and 
subjectivity of manual inspections, the railroad industry has developed wayside detector 
technologies to augment the efforts of inspection personnel.  These systems, located on or 
adjacent to the tracks, use various sensing mechanisms to measure heat, force, sound, and visual 
parameters in order to monitor the condition of railcar components.  Some systems are well 
established within the industry and have been used in revenue service for several decades, while 
other systems are still under development. 
4.1.1   Reactive Inspection Systems 
The first wayside detection systems were designed to identify defective components on 
passing trains in order to prevent derailments.  Developed in the 1930s, 40s and 50s, these early 
technologies (e.g. hot bearing detectors and dragging equipment detectors) have provided a 
reactive means of defect detection, requiring a train to stop on the mainline if a serious defect is 
identified (Post 1936, 1937, Burpee 1945, Austin 1949, Gallagher and Pelino 1959, Lagnebäck 
2007).  Still in wide use today, hot bearing detectors (HBDs) identify overheated journal 
bearings using infrared sensors installed adjacent to the track (Figure 4.1a), and dragging 
equipment detectors (DEDs) identify low hanging equipment using a vertically positioned metal 
board inside the gage of the track, attached to an electronic sensor (Figure 4.1b).  Both of these 







   
               (a)                      (b) 
 
Figure 4.1 Hot Bearing Detector (HBD) (a) and Dragging Equipment Detector (DED) (b),  
Located on a US Class I Railroad 
 
Although still widely used and effective in preventing derailments, these systems only 
provide component defect information shortly before or even after failure has occurred.  
Consequently, these technologies are responsible for thousands of mainline in-service failures 
(ISFs) each year, wherein a train must either stop on the mainline to be repaired or set out at a 
nearby yard or siding.  Service failures due to these wayside detectors result in train delay costs 
and consume mainline capacity.  In addition, these systems require high installation and 
maintenance costs.  Due to the short latency between condition detection and failure occurrence, 
they must be installed at frequent intervals across the entire railroad network.  Therefore, due to 
the high costs and limited predictive ability of these reactive technologies, railroads have sought 
the development of new railcar condition monitoring systems.   
4.1.2  Automated Condition Monitoring Technology (ACMT) 
Automated condition monitoring technology, referred to in this thesis as ACMT, includes 
wayside detection systems capable of monitoring the condition of railcar components over time 
in order to facilitate preventive maintenance.  One example of ACMT currently used in the 
railroad industry is the acoustic bearing detector (ABD).  Using a series of microphones adjacent 
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to the track, ABDs analyze the noise generated by defective roller bearings, associating specific 
frequency ranges with various bearing defects.  Acoustic bearing detection technology was 
initially developed in the late 1980s to address the limitations of HBDs.  However, early 
implementations of ABDs were unable to detect many defects, and the number of bearing related 
derailments remained relatively constant at approximately 50 derailments per year until the late 
1990s (Cline et al. 1998).  Through additional research, ABD technology improved considerably 
and in 2008 there were only 24 derailments due to defective journal bearings (US DOT 2009).  
As a result of these improvements, the AAR has validated ABD technology to be capable of 
detecting condemnable freight car journal bearings (AAR 2008c). 
 Other examples of ACMT include wheel impact load detectors (WILDs), truck 
performance detectors (TPDs), wheel temperature trending (WTT), truck hunting detectors 
(THDs), wheel profile detectors (WPDs), and machine vision.  Detailed surveys of these and 
other wayside inspection technologies have been conducted by: Steets and Tse (1998), Bladon et 
al. (2004), Barke and Chiu (2005), Lagnebäck (2007), Brickle et al. (2008), and Robeda and 
Kalay (2008).  Since derailment prevention has been the prime motivation for development of 
ACMT, a greater emphasis has been placed on monitoring components that are most likely to 
cause a derailment.  As discussed in Chapter 2, FRA accident data indicate that wheels, journal 
bearings, and truck components represent the three categories of railcar components that are 
most susceptible to failure (Figure 2.6).  As a result, at least ten different condition monitoring 
systems have been developed to address these three areas of concern.  A list of these 
technologies, and other ACMT capable of condition monitoring, is provided in Tables 4.1 and 





Table 4.1 Matrix Indicating the Type of ACMT used to Address  
































Three of the systems in Table 4.1 use machine vision technology, which will be discussed 
in greater detail in Chapter 5.  These systems include Automated Inspection of Structural 
Components (AISC), Automated Safety Appliance Inspection System (ASAIS) and the Fully 





   (a)           (b) 
     
  (c)                    (d) 
 
Figure 4.2 Examples of ACMT Including ABD (a), WILD (b), WPD (c), and FATSS (d) 
 
The goal of ACMT is to facilitate condition-based maintenance (CBM).  Through the 
implementation of CBM the physical condition of railcar components is monitored over time, 
allowing for trending analysis, early detection of deteriorating components, and the ability to 
predict component life.  By identifying railcar defects and performing maintenance prior to 
component failure, railroads can reduce the likelihood of equipment-caused derailments and ISFs 
and take advantage of lower cost, predictive maintenance strategies. 
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The wheel impact load thresholds for WILD systems provide a basis for understanding 
how ACMT can facilitate CBM.  Wheelsets that deliver a vertical impact force on the rail 
surpassing 90 kips (thousand pounds) are condemnable per the AAR interchange rules and must 
be replaced.  However, in order to take advantage of CBM, the AAR permits opportunistic 
repairs to be made to wheelsets in the 80-90 kip range.  Presently, this rule applies only to 
railcars that have already been set out in a repair track due to another defect, but these guidelines 
are still effective in enabling defective wheelsets to be removed from service before the wheelset 
degrades further.  These measures serve to reduce the risk of broken-wheel derailments, 
deterioration of the track infrastructure, and wheel-related mainline in-service failures.  Like 
WILDs, each ACMT system uses specific component condition thresholds that allow railroad 
mechanical personnel to identify railcars that are in danger of causing a derailment or in-service 
failure.  For most ACMT, with the exception of WILDs and ABDs, further testing is still 
required before the AAR will adopt the system thresholds into the standard maintenance 
practices of the railcar interchange rules. 
4.2  Current Status of ACMT Development 
In the early 2000s, in order to take better advantage of ACMT the AAR developed the 
Advanced Technology Safety Initiative (ATSI) and Technology Driven Train Inspection (TDTI) 
programs.  Both TDTI and ATSI promote the development of ACMT with the ultimate vision of 
implementing a network of inspection “super sites” where each component of the train will be 
inspected automatically in real time and critical health information for each car will be 
documented and made available to railroad mechanical department personnel (Robeda and Kalay 
2008, Railway Age 2009).  
 The following list of automated condition monitoring / inspection systems summarizes 
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the number of each type that have been deployed in revenue service across the US Class I 
railroad network as of 2010 (Tournay and Stahura 2010): 
• 130 WILDs to identify high wheel impact forces caused by flat and/or out-of-round 
wheels 
• 30 truck steering performance systems (THDs and TPDs) to identify defective truck 
components and wheelsets 
• 25 ABDs and approximately 6,000 HBDs to identify overheated or defective journal 
bearings 
• 10 WPDs to identify wheels containing worn flange, tread, or rim 
• 700 hot/cold wheel detectors used for wheel temperature trending (WTT) to detect 
stuck or inoperative brakes 
• 6,000 DEDs to detect low hanging equipment or foreign objects underneath the train 
• 3 systems for inspecting brake shoe thickness  
• 2 automated safety appliance inspection systems (ASAIS) 
• 1 automated cracked wheel detection system (ACWD) 
All of these systems can be interfaced with TTCI’s Integrated Railway Remote 
Information Service (InteRRIS®), an internet database used to automatically store and analyze 
railroad vehicle performance data (Tournay and Stahura 2010).  Using industry standards and 
performance criteria specified by the customer, InteRRIS® can automatically issue notifications 
using e-mail or a direct data feed (McGuire et al. 2007).  In this way, railroad managers and 
private car owners can have immediate access to critical information pertaining to the condition 
of their freight car fleet.  This information, when used at yards and terminals to coordinate 
inspection and maintenance activity, provides the means necessary for implementing CBM. 
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4.3 Cost of ACMT 
Robert et al. (2009) conducted an analysis investigating the economic viability of 
research, development, and implementation of ACMT.  This study estimated that the net present 
value (NPV) of the benefit from reduced derailments and other accidents attributable to wayside 
detection was approximately $335 million through 2008.  Data from this analysis also show the 
sizeable increase in ACMT investment made by US Class I railroads during the 1990s and 2000s 
(Figure 4.3).  The costs shown in Figure 4.3 include installation, system maintenance, IT costs, 
and InteRRIS® fees for: WILDs, ABDs, TPDs, HWDs, CWDs, THDs, and WPDs.  
 
Figure 4.3 ACMT Installation and Railroad Investment from 1993 through 2008 (Robert et al. 2009) 
 
  
The cost of installation and maintenance varies for each system.  For example, 
installation costs, per detector, can range from $300,000 for an ABD or $600,000 for a WILD to 
over $1 million for a WPD (Robert et al. 2009).  Annual maintenance costs have been estimated 
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at $12,500 for ABDs and WILDs and $20,000 for WPDs (Robert et al. 2009).  From 1990 to 
2008, US Class I railroads invested a total of  $120 million for wayside detector equipment 
installation, operation, maintenance and research (Robert et al. 2009).  Of this total, 
approximately $75 million was invested in ACMT (Figure 4.3).  
In addition to these costs, the implementation of ACMT has resulted in other subsequent 
costs to the railroads.  Since ACMT allows improved condition monitoring, implementation of 
these systems has led to increased railcar maintenance costs.  For example, over $22 million was 
spent from 1990 to 2008 on increased wheelset replacements.  Other costs that can accompany 
the implementation of ACMT affect train operations.  For example, when a WILD identifies a 
wheel impact load above a certain threshold (e.g. 170 kips) the train must be stopped 
immediately.  However, since ACMT facilitates CBM, detector stops caused by these 
technologies occur less frequently than with reactive technologies such as HBDs or DEDs.  As a 
result, the costs to train operations associated with ACMT should be minimal.  Finally, as railcar 
condition information has become more readily available, railroads have begun to implement 
new maintenance practices such as creating railcar condition reports for incoming trains to assist 
car inspectors during inbound inspections.  The cost of these institutional changes, although 
difficult to quantify, can come in the form of education, training, and development of new 
policies and procedures associated with technology integration. 
4.4   Potential Impact of ACMT on Safety 
To determine the potential reduction in damage costs due to ACMT, the effectiveness of 
railcar condition monitoring must be determined.  Improved condition monitoring effectiveness 
will reduce the likelihood of equipment-caused derailments, resulting in fewer injuries and 
fatalities and reduced track, equipment, and property damages.  In addition, preventive 
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maintenance afforded by ACMT will reduce infrastructure damage caused by defective railcar 
components.  The extent to which ACMT increases condition monitoring effectiveness will 
depend on the net difference in accuracy between manual and automated inspection systems.  
Unfortunately, determining inspection accuracy is nontrivial for several reasons.  There are few 
accurate data sources for determining manual inspection accuracy and the accuracy of many 
ACMT systems has not been validated yet because many of these systems have not been in field 
operation for a sufficient amount of time.  As a result, researchers have relied on empirical data 
and retroactive analysis (e.g. post-audits) to determine the cost benefits of ACMT. 
Another challenge to determining the potential safety benefit of ACMT is that some 
inspection tasks have not yet been automated.  Railcar defects affecting the wheels, truck 
components, axles, journal bearings, brakes, and some carbody components can all be monitored 
– at least in part – using currently available ACMT (Lundgren and Killian 2005, Tournay and 
Cummings 2005, McGuire et al. 2007, Robeda and Kalay 2008, Railway Age 2009).  However, 
defective couplers, draft systems, and doors are not yet being monitored using current 
technology.  Machine vision systems will likely be developed to address the inspection of these 
components, however these systems are still at various levels of development and are not yet 
available for commercial use.  Further technological advancements in ACMT will therefore be 
required to gain the full benefit of automated railcar condition monitoring. 
4.5 Potential Impact of ACMT on Efficiency 
 The cost savings due to reduced derailments and infrastructure damage have been the 
prime motivation for development of ACMT, but there are also considerable cost savings 
resulting from improved operational efficiency.  Strategic integration of ACMT can reduce the 
time needed for railcar inspections.  As a result, trains can be processed more quickly through a 
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yard or terminal and repairs can be scheduled more efficiently.  Through CBM, railroads can 
reduce the opportunity cost associated with bad ordering a car by scheduling repairs in such a 
way that multiple components on the car are repaired at the same time.  Other direct and indirect 
cost savings for yard operations resulting from automated railcar inspections will be discussed 
further in Chapter 5.  In addition to improved terminal performance, the increased inspection 
effectiveness afforded by ACMT will result in improved mainline efficiency.  As ACMT allows 
railcar maintenance personnel to remove or repair defective railcar components before failures 
occurs, railroads will benefit from fewer equipment-related mainline in-service failures.  As will 
be discussed in Chapter 6, this can result in reduced train delay and increased mainline capacity, 



















CHAPTER 5: TERMINAL EFFICIENCY 
5.1  Background and Motivation 
As early as 1925, the railway terminal was identified to be a major source of lost 
productivity in freight operations (Droege 1925).  By the 1960s, terminal efficiency had become 
a major focus in railroad engineering research (RSMA 1967).  As railway terminal research 
continued during the latter half of the 20th century, management techniques were also evolving in 
other industries to improve production and manufacturing efficiency.  In the 2000s, various 
production management techniques were applied to terminal operations through the introduction 
of Lean Railroading (Dirnberger 2006, Dirnberger and Barkan 2007).  Lean Railroading offers 
an approach to eliminate operational waste by improving the overall capacity, efficiency and 
asset utilization of a railroad terminal.  As railroads continue to take advantage of newly 
available technologies and management strategies, principles from Lean Railroading can be 
applied to individual aspects of terminal operations, including railcar inspection and maintenance 
practices to further improve efficiency. 
5.1.1  Terminal Performance 
Yards and terminals have a sizeable impact on railroad productivity and reliability.  In 
regards to general manifest traffic, Murray (2002) states that, “Cars spend most of their time in 
terminals, and that’s where the service battle is won or lost for carload business.”  Dirnberger 
cites several reports stating that as much as 64% of railcar transit time is spent in yards 
(Dirnberger 2006, Dirnberger and Barkan 2007).  A common metric used to describe this time 
spent in yards is terminal dwell, which is measured in hours and is defined as the average time a 
car resides at a specified terminal location (AAR 2010c).  Dirnberger noted the relationship 
between terminal dwell and train velocity, concluding that average train speed decreases linearly 
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with increased terminal dwell (Dirnberger 2006, Dirnberger and Barkan 2007).    Average train 
speed, calculated by dividing train-miles by the total hours of train operation (AAR 2010c), is 
often used as a proxy for railroad performance.  An estimation by Logan suggested that for every 
15% reduction in systemwide average terminal dwell, there would be an increase of 2 mph in the 
average train speed for carload traffic (Dirnberger 2006, Logan 2006).  In May 2010, US Class I 
railroads had an average train speed of approximately 25 mph and a systemwide average 
terminal dwell of approximately 22.5 hours (AAR 2010c).  Although the exact relationship 
between terminal dwell and train speed varies among different railroads, reducing the former will 
almost always lead to an increase in the latter. 
5.1.2  Lean Railroading 
The concept of Lean Railroading was developed during the 2000s as an approach to 
improve efficiency in classification yards.  According to Dirnberger, “Because classification 
terminals can be considered production systems, their performance can be improved by adapting 
an integrated approach consisting of three proven production management techniques: lean, 
theory of constraints (TOC), and statistical process control (SPC or Six Sigma)” (Dirnberger 
2006, Dirnberger and Barkan 2007).  In this analysis, I focus only on the concept of lean 
production, as it has been applied to railroad terminal operations, in the form of Lean 
Railroading. 
In 1990, the term “Lean Manufacturing” was first introduced in a study at Massachusetts 
Institute of Technology (MIT).  That study concluded that Toyota production techniques were 
superior to other competitors in the automotive manufacturing industry (Womack et al. 1990).  
These findings helped launch the use of lean methodology and other principles, first 
implemented by Toyota, that have been adopted by numerous companies throughout the world 
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(Womack and Jones 2003).  Although similar principles had previously been used in railroad 
terminals, the first formal application of lean techniques occurred in the 2000s by Dirnberger and 
the Canadian Pacific Railway (CPR) Yard Operations Performance Group.  
Lean is defined as the production of goods or services using minimal buffering costs 
(Hopp and Spearman 2004).  Sources of excessive buffering include both direct waste and 
variability.  Direct waste is lean terminology for unneeded operations.  Examples in rail yards 
include: rework, accidents, injuries, car damage, unnecessary motion, and unnecessary 
information collection (Dirnberger and Barkan 2007).  Most managers focus on the reduction of 
direct waste, but spend less effort on reducing variability.  Variability, however, is a fundamental 
source of waste, as it necessitates buffering in the form of extra inventory, capacity, or time 
(Hopp and Spearman 2004).  In the rail yard, sources of excessive inventory buffering include 
variability in: fueling requirements, the number of railcars or locomotives requiring maintenance, 
and the extent of the maintenance required.  These buffers can come in the form of reserve 
supplies of diesel fuel, freight car and locomotive parts, etc.  Variability in train arrivals and 
unexpected defects requiring maintenance result in excess capacity buffers, which may include 
extra yard tracks, car inspectors, or repair personnel.  Finally, variability in arrival times, 
inspection and repair times, or labor availability may be buffered by adding “slack time” in the 
train schedule.  All of these buffers are a result of the uncertainty inherent to the various 
processes within the rail yard, and they lead to unnecessary costs in the form of indirect waste. 
Adapting work from Hopp and Spearman (2004), Dirnberger developed steps for 
implementing Lean Railroading in terminals (Dirnberger 2006).  These steps included: 
eliminating direct waste, swapping buffers, reducing variability, and performing continuous 
improvement.  Applying a version of Lean Railroading in their yards, CPR saw dramatic 
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improvements over a one-year period: average terminal dwell dropped by over 28%, average 
terminal capacity increased by 40%, and average train speed increased 3.6 mph (Dirnberger 
2006).  Several other railroads and railroad suppliers including UP, BNSF, NS, Belt Railway of 
Chicago, and GE Yard Solutions are now applying aspects of Lean Railroading to improve 
terminal performance (Dirnberger and Barkan 2007).  As railroads continually seek to improve 
terminal performance, new methods and technologies will be integrated into the yard system to 
further eliminate waste and reduce variability.  Improving railcar inspection and maintenance 
practices is one avenue for integrating lean processes with railroad terminal operations. 
5.1.3  Autonomation and Inspection 
The Toyota Production System that first popularized the concept of just-in-time (JIT) 
production was a predecessor to the concept of lean production (Womack et al. 1990).  In 
addition to JIT, a major element of the Toyota Production System is autonomation, or 
“automation with a human touch” (Hopp and Spearman 2010, Ohno 1988).  In the same way that 
lean techniques have been applied to rail terminal operations in a broader sense, the principles of 
autonomation can be applied to railcar inspection and maintenance practices to improve terminal 
performance.  As stated above, a railroad terminal can be viewed as an industrial production 
system.  If the product being “manufactured” is efficient, safe, and reliable transportation 
provided by trains, then the train inspection process can be likened to a form of quality control.  
In many industrial settings, quality control requires visual inspection, which can include manual 













Models of humans and machines have been used to derive hybrid automation, which 
typically performs better than either human or machines alone (Hou et al. 1993, Chi and Drury 
2001).  In general, machines are faster at performing defect detection (search) functions, while 
humans are better at making decisions regarding the validity and/or severity of defects (Hou et 
al. 1993).  In some cases, machines can be useful in aiding a human in those decisions.  For 
example, a computer-vision system could highlight a location within a digital image where a 
defect may be present, and the human operator would decide whether or not the highlighted 
section actually contains a defect.  Railcar inspection systems with well-established detection 
mechanisms (e.g. WILDs or ABDs) could be programmed so that a computer performs the 
decision function when the likelihood of a defect is high (e.g. a wheel impact load of over 
100,000 lbs.), but the decision is deferred to a human inspector when the defect likelihood is 
lower (e.g. a wheel impact under 80,000 lbs).   
In other cases such as machine vision technology, the machine may not always be 
capable of making accurate decisions, so a computer-search human decision system would be 
most appropriate.  For example, a machine vision system may identify a line of mud or dirt as a 
possible cracked center sill.  The system could flag this car, highlight the location in question, 
and allow the car inspector to visually inspect the center sill and confirm or reject the computer’s 
suggestion.  Regardless of the system arrangement, these technologies would eliminate wasted 
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effort and allow car inspectors to focus their attention on the cars that are most likely to have 
component defects. 
5.2  Methodology: Applying Lean to Railcar Inspection  
 Using the four step process developed by Dirnberger (2006), I applied the following Lean 
Railroading process to railcar inspection and maintenance practices:  
1) eliminate direct waste, 2) swap buffers, 3) reduce variability, and 4) perform continuous 
improvement.  Data from a major US Class I railroad terminal were used to assess the potential 
cost benefits of using ACMT in conjunction with lean techniques. 
5.2.1  Eliminate Direct Waste 
The main goal of any lean production system is to convert waste into value.  The first 
step in eliminating waste is to separate the value-adding operations in the system from the non-
value adding operations.  Actions that create no value but are unavoidable with current 
technologies are considered Type I waste, whereas steps that create no value and can be 
immediately avoided are considered Type II waste (Womack and Jones 2003).  In this case study 
of railcar inspection processes, I consider both Type I and Type II waste. 
5.2.1.1  Type I Waste: Inherent but Unavoidable Waste 
 One example of Type I waste inherent to railcar inspection is the tagging of bad order 
cars.  As discussed in Chapter 3, each time a car inspector identifies a railcar in need of major 
repair, a bad order card (Figure 3.6) must be completed and affixed to each side of the railcar.  
The tagging of bad order cards creates Type I waste because there is currently no available 
technology designed to automate this process, thus it must be performed manually.  Data from 
empty coal train inspections in one major US Class I railroad terminal indicate a linear increase 
of approximately 9.9 minutes (0.166 hrs) in total inspection time for every additional bad order 
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Figure 5.1 Average Coal Train Inspection Times as a Function of the  
Number of Bad Orders Found per Train 
 
These data suggest that it takes car inspectors approximately 10 minutes to perform the 
following tasks: 1) identify an FRA-reportable defect, 2) complete required documentation on 
the bad order cards, and 3) attach one bad order card to each side of the defective railcar.  By 
lean production standards, this process creates Type I waste, because it does not improve the 
train’s condition, and if the appropriate technology and procedures were in place, the time 
needed for this process could be greatly reduced. 
Nationwide, hundreds of thousands of freight cars are bad ordered each year.  Therefore, 
assuming new technology could reduce the time needed to document a bad order, the railroad 
industry could substantially reduced Type I waste in railroad terminals.  This could be 
accomplished by linking wayside detection systems and automatic equipment identification 
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(AEI) data with handheld devices in the yard, allowing car inspectors to electronically bad order 
cars.  Innovations such as this would improve productivity through the elimination of wasted 
effort. 
5.2.1.2  Type II Waste: Immediately Avoidable Waste 
 An inspection process, by definition, does not add value to the customer and therefore 
generates operational waste.  In many industries, product inspection (i.e. quality control) is a 
necessary requirement due to imperfections in the manufacturing system.  In the yard production 
system, the products (outbound trains equipped with the necessary resources to travel safely and 
reliably to their next destination) are made of many reusable parts (locomotives and railcars), 
some of which contain defects with varying levels of severity.  Railcar inspection, in and of 
itself, does not add value to the product, but rather allows the opportunity for value to be added 
through car repair and more reliable, efficient train operation.  After inspecting an entire train, a 
car inspector has not added value to that train unless he or she has made a repair or in some other 
way improved the condition of at least one railcar in the train.  For this reason, a primary 
industry goal for improving railcar maintenance practices is to “turn finders into fixers” (Railway 
Age 2009).  ACMT can be used to find defects so railroad mechanical department personnel can 
spend their time adding value to the product. 
 A specific example of Type II waste is the unnecessary redundancy that occurs when 
railcars are inspected too often.  Under current industry practices, non-defective railcars are 
regularly inspected numerous times between origin and destination.  In general, there is no 
system in place to record the results of these inspections.  This process is redundant, inefficient 
and suboptimal in terms of achieving the actual goal of finding and repairing defects before they 
cause a problem.  Inspectors have no way to know with any certainty if a particular component 
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was found to be in satisfactory condition at the previous inspection point.  Consequently, they 
must expend time inspecting all components, regardless of their actual condition.  This process is 
repeated over and over again with the result that some components that are quickly inspected are 
over-monitored.  Meanwhile, components or conditions on the railcar that are difficult to assess 
may not be carefully or frequently observed.  This result is a direct outcome of adherence to the 
current regulations that emphasize inspection frequency, not efficient detection and repair of 
defects.  
Recently, there have been efforts to reduce the time car inspectors spend inspecting 
healthy (non-defective) railcars.  In 2008 the FRA amended the regulations pertaining to freight 
equipment to allow trains equipped with electronically controlled pneumatic (ECP) brakes to 
travel up to 3,500 miles before stopping for an air-brake inspection (US DOT 2010).  Through 
the implementation of ECP brakes, railroads can reduce Type II waste and immediately recover 
the labor costs associated with excessive car inspections, while at the same time achieve the 
associated safety benefits. 
Data collected at one Class I railroad terminal indicate that manual Class IA inspections 
take between 80 and 140 minutes (1.33 to 2.33 hours) per train, depending on train type (Figure 
5.2).  Train inspection procedures on most Class I railroads use two car inspectors per train, one 
on each side of the train.  As a result, a 140-minute coal train inspection requires 4.66 person-
hours of labor.  These inspection times are generally consistent with observations at other Class I 



















Figure 5.2 Average Train Inspection Times for Various Train Types 
 
Differences in inspection times are likely the result of differences in train length and the 
priorities placed on different train types, with intermodal trains having the highest priority.  Since 
most inspections require one car inspector to be positioned on each side of the train, this results 
in 2.67 to 4.67 person-hours of labor per train.  Since most trains contain only a few cars with 
component defects, the majority of this time involves inspecting cars that have none.  Therefore, 
by equipping trains with ECP brakes, railroads could run unit trains 3.5 times farther between 
inspections, resulting in the elimination of one or two Class IA inspections per long-haul train.  
The reduction in Type II waste alone would not be enough to justify the cost of retrofitting an 
entire train with ECP brakes; however, this is a major factor that should be considered when 
assessing the potential benefits of ECP brakes.  Furthermore, as ACMT continues to develop and 
more systems are validated for accuracy, additional regulatory relief may be offered by the FRA.  
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This would allow for longer distances between Class IA inspections on routes containing a 
sufficient number of wayside condition monitoring sites.  
5.2.2  Swap Buffers 
To improve efficiency, buffers can be swapped to eliminate indirect waste.  According to 
lean methodology, for a given set of resources, when one buffer is reduced, another buffer must 
be increased.  A common practice of Lean Railroading is to decrease the time buffer (dwell time) 
by increasing either the inventory or capacity buffer (Dirnberger and Barkan 2007).  One 
example of how buffers can be swapped as a result of ACMT is by shifting mechanical personnel 
from inspection tasks to repair activities.  As ACMT is used to augment manual railcar 
inspections, less labor will be required to perform the same number of inspections.  As a result, 
railroad managers can shift personnel from the inspection yard to the repair facility, reducing the 
time buffer and increasing the capacity buffer.  This increase in the capacity buffer would 
potentially allow more cars to be repaired.  In this way, waste can be eliminated and value added 
to the system through car repair.  However, there may be factors that limit the extent to which the 
capacity buffer can be increased such as the size of the repair facility or the number of available 
repair tracks.  As a result, railroads must incorporate a broad, system-wide view of all relevant 
processes before appropriate buffers can be determined. 
5.2.3  Reduce Variability 
Variability is a subtle but important source of waste.  By reducing system variability, 
tasks can become more autonomous and buffers can be reduced.  The maintenance of railcars is 
subject to considerable variability because bad orders of varying degrees of severity are often 
encountered and must be addressed.  This variability can lead to waste because resources, 
including replacement parts and labor, are limited.  For example, if there are only a few bad 
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orders during the course of one week, the extra unused parts remain unused and repair personnel 
sit idle.  Conversely, if there are more bad orders than usual, there may not be enough repair 
personnel to perform all the work, they may run out of replacement parts, and there may not be 
enough capacity for the cars to be accommodated in the repair facility.  Thus, variability in the 
car inspection process leads to variability in the car repair process, resulting in an increase in the 
time buffer and impeding the efficiency of the more important, value-adding activities. 
When a train contains more defective railcars than normal, there is a negative impact on 
productivity.  Data from one Class I railroad terminal indicates that repair time for wheelset 
replacement increases non-linearly as the number of bad orders per train increases (Figure 5.3), 





















Figure 5.3 Average Wheelset Replacement Times at a Major US Class I  
Railroad Terminal, 2008-2009 
 
In order to maintain a high level of efficiency, the variability in the number of required 
repairs should be reduced.  A lean production method of reducing variability is to regulate work-
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in-process (WIP) levels.  WIP is the amount of unfinished product that is moving through the 
manufacturing system at a given time.  In the context of railcar inspection, condition-based 
maintenance can help regulate WIP and reduce variability.  Condition-based maintenance (CBM) 
is a form of preventive maintenance based on vehicle performance and/or parameter monitoring 
and involves taking corrective action prior to component failure (Lagnebäck 2007).  If wayside 
detection thresholds are set appropriately, not only can component deterioration be detected at an 
early stage in order to prevent derailments, but maintenance can also be planned efficiently and 
WIP levels can be regulated to reduce system variability.  If the condition of railcar components 
can be monitored in such a way that a “window-of-opportunity” is identified for all repair types, 
then railroad managers could potentially select an optimal workload for their repair personnel 
and facility.  Defects that are condemnable by FRA requirements, or otherwise needing 
immediate attention, would have the highest priority, but less severe defects within the window-
of-opportunity would not have to be repaired unless there were sufficient resources to address the 
specific defect.  These types of “opportunistic repairs” are currently possible through the use of 
WILDs and ABDs, but other forms of ACMT are not yet capable of this level of CBM.  As 
development and implementation of ACMT progresses, other methods may be used, such as 
Statistical Process Control (SPC), to develop optimal wayside detector thresholds to 
appropriately reduce car maintenance variability while ensuring that critical defects are repaired 
prior to failure.  These methods would provide railroad managers the ability to maximize the 
efficiency of their workforce and reduce time and inventory buffers.  
5.2.4  Continuous Improvement 
 As new inspection technologies are developed and implemented, the railcar maintenance 
process will need to be continually examined and improved.  Regardless of how diligently 
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managers pursue the reduction of variability, it will always exist in the production system (Hopp 
and Spearman 2010).  As a result, railroad management should take an active approach towards 
balancing time, inventory, and capacity buffers.  As the maintenance process becomes more and 
more predictive, new railcar parts can be ordered as they are needed, rather than keeping large 
stockpiles of unused parts.  As demonstrated by Toyota’s JIT production methods, this approach 
to maintenance will reduce the inventory buffer.  In addition, as railcars are maintained more 
efficiently, car availability and asset utilization will improve, railcar cycle times will decrease, 
and fewer cars will be required to provided the same level of service.  This increase in the 
capacity buffer will result in various management options:  
1) liquidate rolling stock assets and recover capital investment costs, 2) consolidate or remove 
storage tracks to recover capital investment and maintenance costs associated with underutilized 
infrastructure, or 3) absorb the additional capacity by pursuing new business.  In this way, 
application of lean principles through the use of ACMT can have lasting and far-reaching 
economic benefits.  
5.3  Results  
5.3.1  Calculation of Current Waste Due to 1,000-Mile Unit Train Inspections 
The largest portion of waste associated with the maintenance of railcars is the manual 
inspection of railcars without defects.  As ACMT develops, wayside detection systems will 
provide the capability of performing comprehensive and autonomous inspection of all aspects of 
the railcar, leaving inspection personnel with responsibility to verify defects identified by the 
automated system and make necessary repairs.  In this way, waste will be reduced from the time 
required to inspect an entire train to the time required to inspect several defective (or potentially 
defective) cars per train.   
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The greatest initial benefit, in terms of waste reduction, will be reduced labor during the 
inspection of unit trains.  Since these trains often travel long distances, they are required to stop 
for FRA Class IA, 1,000-mile air brake inspections.  Unless the locomotives need refueling or a 
new train crew, this inspection is the only reason for the intermediate stop.  In addition, unit 
trains will be the first to benefit from ACMT that incorporates machine vision technology.  The 
first generations of many of the computer algorithms required for these systems were developed 
to inspect cars that are similar in design.  In my preliminary analysis, the savings for unit train 
inspections are calculated using data from one Class I rail terminal that inspects a large number 
of unit coal trains each year.   
Train inspection data for this terminal is given in Table 5.2.  In order to quantify the 
savings due to waste reduction, the annual labor cost required for a hybridized ACMT approach 
(see Table 5.1) is subtracted from the annual labor costs for the conventional, manual inspection. 
 







5.3.2  Manual Inspection Cost 
Annual labor costs for manual Class IA unit train inspections are calculated as follows: 
Cmanual = 2 ×Tmanual × N × S        (1) 
where, 
Cmanual  = total annual labor cost for manual inspections, in US dollars 
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Tmanual  = average manual inspection time (weighted by train type), in hours 
N  = number of 1,000-mile inspections per year 
S = average hourly compensation for car inspectors, including benefits in US dollars 
The average inspection time, Tmanual, is determined by taking a weighted average of the 
inspection times for each train type from Table 5.2, resulting in 2.16 hours per train.  For this 
terminal, N is equal to 13,340 unit train inspections per year.  Converting the average annual 
salary of a car inspector ($81,400 including benefits) to an hourly rate, S is equal to $39.13 per 
hour (AAR 2008b).  This is a conservative estimate, as mechanical department manager salaries 
have not been included.  Multiplying all of these values by two, to account for the fact that most 
car inspections involve two car inspectors, Cmanual is approximately $2,255,280 for this terminal. 
5.3.3  Hybrid ACMT Inspection Cost 
For this example, I assume a computer-search human decision inspection system (Table 
5.1).  For this hybrid system, the ACMT identifies component defects and flags potentially 
defective cars before a train arrives in a yard.  When the train arrives, car inspectors inspect only 
the flagged cars and make decisions regarding whether those cars should be repaired or bad 
ordered or whether they are deemed satisfactory for continued operation.  Annual labor costs for 
hybridized unit train inspections are calculated as follows: 
Chybrid = (D× Aautomated + Fautomated ) ×Thybrid × N × S     (2)  
where, 
Chybrid  = total annual labor cost for hybrid inspections, in US dollars 
D = average number of detectable FRA defects per train inspection 
Aautomated = average correct identification percentage for automated wayside detectors  
Fautomated = average false alarm rate for automated wayside detectors 
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Thybrid  = average inspection time to verify a single component defect, in hours 
 
As discussed in Chapter 3, the average number of detectable FRA defects per train 
inspection, D, is difficult to assess due to the fact that manual inspection records are not kept.  
For purposes of illustration, D is assumed to be 5 (approximately 3 more than the average 
number of defects detected per train by FRA MP&E inspectors from Table 3.1), resulting in a 
manual inspection accuracy of approximately 60%.  Uncertainty in the value of D was addressed 
using a sensitivity analysis.  
Current wayside inspection technology is capable of maintaining accuracies ranging from 
90% to 99% (Steets and Tse 1998, Morgan 2002, Morgan and Gerald 2003, Schlake et al. 2010), 
so an average of 95% is used for Aautomated.  Although false alarm rates vary widely among 
systems, an average of 10% was used for Fautomated.  For purposes of illustration, I assume that 5 
out of 100 trains containing a component defect will pass the wayside detectors without being 
flagged (95% correct identification rate) and an additional 10 out of 100 healthy (non-defective) 
trains will be incorrectly flagged by the wayside detectors (10% false alarm rate).  The average 
inspection time required for a car inspector to verify a flagged railcar, Thybrid, is assumed to be 10 
minutes, regardless of train type.  Using data from Table 5.2, the total labor cost associated with 
a hybridized inspection process (Chybrid) is $422,840 per year.  Subtracting this from the labor 
costs required for the current manual inspection process results in $1,832,440 of annual labor 
cost savings for this specific terminal.   
These costs are sensitive to both the number of inspections considered, N, and the overall 
condition of the railcar fleet, represented in this model by D.  As railcar maintenance improves 
and becomes more preventive due to ACMT, D should decrease over time.  To better understand 
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the expected labor costs at varying magnitudes of N and D, I conducted a sensitivity analysis 


























Figure 5.4 Sensitivity Analysis Showing Labor Cost Savings for Varying Levels of  
Railcar Fleet Size (N) and Railcar Condition (D) 
 
 
In all cases, labor cost savings decrease linearly with D.  Therefore, as maintenance 
practices improve, D will decrease and cost savings will increase.  Values for N are 
representative of a single (major) Class I railroad terminal (N = 10,000), an entire Class I railroad 
(N = 50,000), and all US Class I railroads (N = 250,000).  Although these are rough estimates, 
they enable comparisons among various magnitudes of N.  Assuming approximately 250,000 
Class IA train inspections per year and less than 5 detectable FRA defects per train inspection, 
the US railroad industry would save over $35 million per year in reduced labor costs.  Although 
not included in this analysis, ACMT can also provide additional savings as preventive 
maintenance strategies increase car utilization rates.   
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Although discussed in Section 4.3, capital and operating costs of ACMT development, 
installation and maintenance were not considered in the evaluation of terminal efficiency.  An 
exhaustive study of the costs and benefits of ACMT and terminal efficiency was beyond the 
scope of this thesis.  However, the analysis provides a basis for further, more detailed research 
on the benefits of applying lean methodology in conjunction with ACMT to improve terminal 
efficiency. 
5.3.4  Summary of Results 
This economic analysis indicates that the use of a hybridized machine-search human 
decision inspection process is over five times more efficient, in terms of labor costs, than pure 
manual inspection (i.e. Cmanual / Chybrid = 5.3).  These results, although limited to a single Class I 
railroad terminal, demonstrate the potential for significant reduction in operational waste.  
Although wayside detection technology is not yet implemented to the level where every railroad 
terminal could benefit from the hybrid process, the efficiency of a large portion of these 
inspections could be improved by eliminating manual inspection of healthy cars.  In addition to 
these savings, other costs can be reduced through the elimination of other forms of waste, the 
appropriate allocation of buffers, and the reduction of variability. 
5.4  Conclusions and Discussion  
Railroad yards, like other manufacturing systems, can substantially benefit from the 
application of lean production methods.  A methodology has been presented for the application 
of Lean Railroading to railcar inspection and maintenance practices using the four-step approach 
of: 1) eliminating direct waste, 2) swapping buffers, 3) reducing variability, and 4) performing 
continuous improvement.  An example Class I railroad terminal was used to calculate the 
potential reduction in direct waste, and a savings of approximately $1.8 million was estimated 
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for a single terminal.  If these results are extended to the Class I railroad industry, 
implementation of the first step of Lean Railroading could save them over $35 million per year.  
Through the implementation of steps 2 through 4, additional operational cost savings could be 
realized. 
 In order to eliminate the operational waste associated with railcar inspection practices, 
two industry milestones must be reached.  First, automated wayside detection systems capable of 
monitoring all safety-critical railcar components must be fully developed and integrated.  This 
will require the development of reliable and robust condition monitoring systems capable of 
addressing every aspect of the FRA Class IA 1,000-mile air-brake inspection.  When this is 
achieved, new regulations may then be adopted to allow automated technology to augment 
manual inspection, resulting in a more effective and efficient hybrid system.  The industry has 
already begun to move in this direction, as regulations have been introduced to allow extended-
haul trains to travel up to 1,500 miles before stopping for a required inspection (US DOT 2010).  
In addition, trains equipped with electronically controlled pneumatic (ECP) brakes are permitted 
to travel up to 3,500 miles before a required air brake inspection (US DOT 2010).  As wayside 
detection systems are further incorporated into railroad mechanical practices, the distance 









CHAPTER 6: MAINLINE EFFICIENCY 
6.1  Lean Approach to Evaluate Mainline Efficiency 
In Chapter 5, the concept of Lean Railroading was introduced and applied to yards and 
terminals to determine the potential impact of improved inspection and maintenance practices on 
terminal performance.  To understand the broader impact of ACMT on network efficiency, 
mainlines operations must also be considered.  In this chapter, the lean principles of waste 
elimination and variability reduction are used to understand potential gains in mainline 
efficiency.  First, simulation data and a linear train delay cost calculator (TDCC) were used to 
quantify the direct waste associated with equipment-caused in-service failures (ISFs) for a 
single-track route.  Next, a similar analysis was conducted using both single and double-track 
routes to assess changes in variability as a function of both traffic density and length of ISF. 
6.2  Analysis of Train Delay 
As US freight traffic volumes have risen in recent years, research has been undertaken to 
better understand train delay and the impact of delay on network capacity and reliability.  
Schafer (2006) developed a train delay cost calculator (TDCC) to estimate the amount of train 
delay and the corresponding costs of broken rail derailments and service failures.  In 2009, a 
study was conducted to understand the impact of higher train speed on freight railroad mainline 
capacity (Harrod 2009).  More recent research has used Rail Traffic Controller (RTC) from 
Berkeley Simulation Software to analyze the impact of train type heterogeneity on railway 
capacity (Dingler et al. 2009).  RTC is a dispatch simulation software package used by the North 
American railroad industry to simulate both freight and passenger train operations (PBQ&D 
2002, WGI 2007).  Dingler (2010) provides an in-depth study of the use of RTC to investigate 
train delay and its relationship to capacity (Dingler 2010).  In the current study, I conducted RTC 
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simulations on both single and double-track routes.  I used results from these simulations to 
assess the potential economic impact of reducing equipment-related ISFs through the use of 
ACMT. 
ISFs result in both primary and secondary delays.  Primary, or exogenous delay is direct 
delay due to an external event affecting only the train experiencing a mechanical defect 
(Mattsson 2007).  This includes either the time needed to repair a broken or defective railcar 
while on the mainline, or the time required to set out a car on a passing siding for future repair.  
Secondary delay, also called reactionary delay (Gibson et al. 2002), is the delay to all other trains 
in the network that are affected in some manner by the service outage.  According to lean 
principles, both primary and secondary train delay due to equipment-caused ISFs represent direct 
waste in the railroad network.  Through improved CBM afforded by ACMT, the frequency of 
ISFs, and the resulting operational waste, could be greatly reduced.  
In this study, I analyzed the effect of train delay on unit coal train traffic.  In 2008, coal 
traffic comprised the greatest portion of tonnage and carloads originated (45 and 26 percent, 
respectively) and the most gross revenue (24 percent) among all commodities transported by the 
US Class I railroads (AAR 2009b).  Additionally, unit coal trains operate on some of the highest 
density rail corridors in North America, where delays due to ISFs have the greatest impact.  
Another reason for analyzing unit coal train traffic is the small variation in the design of railcars 
used to transport coal.  This uniformity is advantageous for the design and implementation of 
machine vision and certain other condition monitoring systems.  For both of these reasons, the 




6.3  Train Delay Cost Calculator (TDCC) 
The total cost due to train delay from a service interruption can be estimated using the 
following formula modified from Schafer (2006): 
 
       (3) 
where, 
C = total train delay cost for multiple trains 
T = total delay time for service interruption 
x = cost of delay per train-hour 
m = number of following trains delayed = T/t (rounded to the nearest integer) 
t = hours per train arrival (24 hours / number trains per day) 
 
The TDCC represented by Equation 3 provides a cost estimate based on traffic volume 
(in trains per day) for a single-track route segment and assumes that trains arrive at constant time 
intervals from both directions.  At least one US class I railroad estimates major derailments using 
a linear approximation, similar to the TDCC.  Using this equation, total train delay (i.e. C / x) 






























Figure 6.1 Total Delay Times for Various Durations of ISF  
Calculated Using the TDCC (Equation 3) 
 
Using the TDCC, total train delay increases linearly with traffic volume.  In addition, 
total train delay also increases with the length of ISF.  The linear increase in delay with traffic 
volume is due to an increase in secondary delay.  At low traffic volumes, the other trains on the 
route are unaffected because the average headway (i.e. the spacing between trains) is longer than 
the ISF.  Therefore, for all traffic volumes less than 24 trains per day (one per hour), a one-hour 
ISF results in only the one hour of primary delay.  However, at the other extreme, a 5-hour ISF 
on a track segment with 40 trains per day would cause over 23 hours of total train delay.  In this 
case, the total secondary delay is approximately 18 hours. 
6.4  Dispatch Simulation Analysis – Single-Track Route 
A common method of calculating train delay is through the use of dispatch simulation 
software, such as RTC.  Previous rail capacity research using RTC provides a substantial 
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background for the application of this software (Dingler 2010).  A similar methodology was used 
in the current study, including the development of a representative North American single-track 
mainline subdivision and corresponding train schedule (Table 6.1).  






The attributes used for this simulation are idealized for simplicity, as the purpose of this 
study is to determine the relative impacts of ISF length and traffic volume on mainline train 
delay.  This analysis provides a baseline cost estimate for a typical rail route; however, 
estimation of costs for a particular route would require the actual characteristics specific to that 
route.  The analysis presented here is intended as a guide to the methodology and to provide 
insights regarding the relative magnitude of the effects that might be expected in a route-specific 
analysis. 
Traffic consisted of 115-car unit coal trains on a 260-mile, single-track route.  In order to 
replicate typical coal route operations, loaded trains were run in one direction along the route, 
while empty trains were run in the opposite direction.  During the simulation, a train was stopped 
at random times on the mainline in order to replicate 1, 3, and 5-hour ISFs.  Twenty-four 
simulations were performed using a random variation of train starts, with each train departing 
within a range of 30-minutes.  In other words, each train departure could vary by plus or minus 
15 minutes from its scheduled departure time.  The total delay time was determined by 
Route Characteristics Train Characteristics 
 
260 miles long 
10 miles between control points 
8,000 ft. signaled sidings 
2.5-mile signal spacing 
3-block, 4-aspect signaling 
0% grade and curvature 
 
Unit coal trains 
115 cars, 6,325 ft. long 
16,445 tons per train (loaded) 
3,795 tons per train (empty) 
0.78 HP / trailing ton 
3 SD70 4,300 HP locomotives 
Maximum speed: 50 mph 
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subtracting the inherent delay for the base case (i.e. simulations without a service failure) from 

























Figure 6.2 Average Train Delay Data Generated from RTC Dispatch Simulation Software  
for Varying ISF Durations 
  
 Similar to data from the TDCC (Figure 6.1), delay times increase with traffic volume, 
however the RTC delay data display a different trend.  At low traffic volumes, up to 
approximately 20 trains per day (T/D), the increase in average delay times is close to linear.  A 
traffic volume of 20 T/D corresponds to approximately 74 annual million gross tons (ANMGT), 
assuming an equal amount of loaded and empty trains.  However, at higher volumes (i.e. above 
20 T/D), the data indicate an exponential relationship.  This exponential relationship is consistent 
with findings from other railway capacity research (Gibson et al. 2002, Mattsson 2007).  In 
addition, train delay curves increase more sharply for ISFs of greater duration, indicating that 
mainline capacity on this route is also sensitive to the length of ISF.   
The increases in train delay are mainly due to an increase in secondary delay.  The 
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primary advantage of using RTC as compared to the TDCC is the ability to more accurately 
predict the secondary delay caused by an ISF.  For example, RTC simulations capture the 
“shockwave” effect created by an ISF, akin to those observed in highway traffic streams (Garber 
2009).  Thus, a primary advantage of using RTC as compared to a linear train delay cost 
calculator is the ability to more accurately predict delays to following trains that are far away 
from the location of the ISF.  In addition, RTC incorporates the time needed for braking and 
acceleration, thus providing more realistic train delay estimates. 
6.4.1  Delay Cost Estimation for In-Service Failures 
 To determine the delay cost incurred by a railroad due to an ISF, delay time is multiplied 
by a constant delay cost figure that includes four components: car cost, locomotive cost, fuel 
cost, and crew labor cost.  The delay cost incorporates both the actual consumption of railroad 
company resources as well as the opportunity cost (in the case of cars and locomotives) of 
resources that are underutilized.  A recent estimation of average total train delay cost was 
approximately $213 per train-hour for US Class I railroads (Schafer 2006, Schafer and Barkan 
2008).  This figure assumed an average of 69.2 cars per train and 2.7 locomotives per train, and 
did not incorporate the lost revenue, or opportunity cost, due to lading delay.  Dingler (2010) 
recently approximated lading delay for a 99-car bulk commodity unit train to be approximately 
$410 per train-hour.  
For the current study on coal trains, I assumed 115 cars and 3 locomotives per train.  
Accounting for these changes, the train delay cost (excluding lading delay) increased to $232 per 
train-hour.  Additionally, increasing the train length from 99 cars to 115 cars resulted in an 
increase in the lading delay cost, resulting in a cost of $430 per train-hour.  This results in a total 
train delay cost of $662 per train-hour.  Using this value, cost curves were determined at various 
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Figure 6.3 Comparison of RTC and TDCC Estimates of Total Delay Costs Due to  
3 and 5-Hour ISFs at Varying Traffic Volumes 
 
For traffic volumes up to approximately 20 T/D, total delay cost estimates using the 
TDCC are close to the RTC simulation estimates.  At this volume, both estimation methods 
predict delay costs of about $10,000 and $4,000 for 5-hour and 3-hour ISFs respectively.  Thus 
the TDCC can be an effective tool for estimating train delay for low and medium traffic 
volumes.  However, at higher volumes, RTC simulation data closely follow an exponential 
relationship, suggesting longer total delays than predicted using the simple linear model. 
RTC simulation data suggest that for traffic volumes above 40 T/D (approximately 148 
ANMGT), delay costs for a 5-hour ISF would be approximately $60,000.  In most cases, 
however, ISFs will result in delays shorter than five hours.  In general, less severe ISFs result in 
one of two scenarios: 1) the train will be inspected and repaired along the line-of-road and then 
continue service after repairs have been made, or 2) the defective railcar(s) is removed from the 
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train and set out at a storage track, passing siding, or yard.  For either case, industry surveys 
estimate that the train will typically be delayed between 1 and 2 hours.  Using an approximation 
of 1.5 hours, I estimated the potential costs of different types of ISFs at various traffic levels: low 
(10 T/D, or 37 ANMGT), medium (20 T/D, or 74 ANMGT), and high (40 T/D, 148 ANMGT) 
(Table 6.2).  Given an example single-track route with a medium traffic volume and 1,000 ISFs 
per year, train delays would cost over $2.1 million using the RTC cost estimate. 
Table 6.2 Delay Cost for an Example 1.5-Hour ISF;  






For longer mainline service outages (e.g. 24 to 48 hour ISFs caused by major 
derailments), it was not practical to perform RTC simulations due to the amount of time and 
computer memory that would be required.  Therefore, the TDCC was the best option for 
estimating train delay costs for major derailments.  Using the TDCC for a medium traffic volume 
of 20 T/D, a 24-hour derailment would result in approximately $170,000 of train delay costs 
while a 48-hour derailment would cost approximately $650,000.  Due to the rerouting that occurs 
and the additional complexities that accompany derailments, actual train delay costs may be 
much higher.  In addition, for higher traffic volumes, the delay costs would most likely increase 
nonlinearly, resulting in much higher values.   
6.5  Dispatch Simulation Analysis – Double-Track Route 
Since many of the primary corridors used to transport coal traffic experience large 
volumes and require a high level of maintenance, these routes are often built with multiple 
mainline tracks.  As a result, RTC simulations were conducted using an example double-track 
Traffic Volume  
(Trains per Day: ANMGT) 














route.  As before, 1, 3, and 5-hour ISFs were randomly initiated in order to quantify total train 
delay at various traffic volumes (Figure 6.4).  In this case, twenty-two random simulations were 
conducted on the new route using the same train and route characteristics as before (Table 6.1), 
except that the entire route contained two mainline tracks instead of a single-track with sidings.  
The simulations implemented directional running (i.e. empty and loaded coal trains travelled in 
opposite directions, with each train type primarily using only one specified track).  When 
necessary, trains were able to cross over to the other mainline track to run around a stopped train, 

























Figure 6.4 Total Train Delay as a Function of Traffic Volume with 95 Percent Confidence Intervals 
for 1, 3, and 5-hour ISFs on a Double-Track Route 
 
 
Similar to the single-track simulations (Figure 6.2), train delay increases with an increase 
in either traffic volume or the length of ISF.  As before, the increase is due to increased 
secondary delay.  For traffic volumes less than approximately 48 T/D (i.e. one train on each 
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mainline track per hour) average train delay increases linearly with traffic volume.  However, 
above 48 T/D, train delay increases exponentially. 
In addition, variation in average delay times increases both at higher traffic volumes and 
for longer ISFs.  A 95 percent confidence interval was used to determine the upper and lower 
bounds (denoted by the bars above and below each data point for average train delay) (Figure 
6.4).  As traffic volume increases, the confidence intervals become larger, indicating that 
variability is increasing.  This variability in the system generates indirect waste that should be 
accounted for in addition to the direct waste created by train delay.  An analysis of train delay 
variability is provided in section 6.7. 
6.6 Cost Estimation Using Both Single and Double-Track Routes 
 Mainline capacity is directly related to the physical infrastructure along a fixed route 
length.  Increasing the number of tracks on a line (e.g. upgrading from single-track to double-
track) results in a disproportionately greater increase in network capacity (Mattsson 2007).  As a 
result, for traffic volumes under 48 T/D (approximately 177 ANMGT) the delay costs due to 
ISFs on a double-track route are almost negligible in comparison to those on a single-track route.  
Consequently, these values are not shown in Figure 6.5.  The delay costs at these low volumes 
are all less than $4,500, regardless of the length of ISF and they display a linear trend as seen 








































Figure 6.5 Total Train Delay as a Function of Traffic Volume for 1, 3, and 5-hour  
ISFs on Single and Double-Track Routes 
  
In order to estimate the number of equipment-caused ISFs per year, I conducted a survey 
of three US Class I railroads.  Based on data from these railroads, I estimated that there were 
approximately 11,500 mainline ISFs that could potentially have been detected by ACMTs (e.g. 
HBD stops, burnt off journals, broken axles, knuckle failures, load shifts, wheel defects, WILD 
stops, sticking brakes, hot wheel etc.)  I did not include DED stops or ISFs related to defective 
air hoses because these defects are addressed by reactive technologies rather than ACMT.  Since 
the total freight car miles traveled on the three surveyed railroads in 2008 comprised 
approximately 50% of all freight car miles traveled on US Class I railroads that year, I estimate a 
rate of approximately 670 ACMT-detectable defects per BFCM, and by extrapolation estimate 
that there were approximately 23,000 detectable equipment-caused ISFs in 2008.  This is a 
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conservative estimate due to difficulties in determining the exact causes for some ISFs and 
exactly which defects could be detected by ACMT. 
Based on these numbers, total delay costs were calculated using delay cost estimates for a 
1.5-hour ISF (using RTC data and a value of $662 per train hour) and average traffic volumes for 
different track types on the US railroad network (Table 6.3).  
 
Table 6.3 Train Delay Cost and Percentage of Ton-Miles by Traffic Type Based on RTC Simulation 
Data for a 1.5-Hour ISF with Various Traffic Volumes (BTS 2006) 
 
 
Averages for the percentage of ton-miles on various single and double-track routes were 
determined using data from the Bureau of Transportation Statistics (BTS), National 
Transportation Atlas (BTS 2006).  Although these ton-mile percentages include other types of 
traffic besides unit coal trains, final cost estimates should still be conservative because lading 
delay costs for other commodities will generally be higher.  These data indicate that only one 
percent of US ton-miles are transported on routes with more than two mainline tracks, and since 
delay costs would be minimal, these routes were not included.   
Multiplying delay costs by ton-mile percentages at each level of traffic and the total 
number of ISFs per year (approximately 23,000), the annual delay costs due to ISFs is 
approximately $37.4 million per year for US class I railroads.  For comparison, the average 
annual cost of track and equipment damages due to mainline derailments (from Chapter 2) was 
approximately $38 million for the four largest US Class I railroads from 1999 to 2008 (US DOT 
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2009, Schlake et al. 2010). Thus, delay costs due to mainline delay from ISFs are comparable to 
costs associated with derailments. 
6.7  Variability in Train Delay 
 Because variability results in buffering (e.g. added slack time in train schedules), it is a 
fundamental source of waste (Hopp and Spearman 2004).  Based on RTC simulations, the 
variability associated with equipment-related mainline train delay increases with both traffic 
volume and length of ISF.  Both factors were analyzed separately using frequency diagrams 
depicting the number of trains delayed, versus the length of individual train delay (in minutes) 
per 100 train miles.  The lengths of individual train delays were divided into 10 frequency bins 










Figure 6.6 Frequency Diagram Showing the Amount of Delay For Each Train Due to Various ISFs 
on a Single-Track Route with 52 T/D 
 
The frequency bins ranged from 0 to over 270 minutes for the single-track route and from 
0 to 90 minutes for the double-track route.  Trains in the first bin are those that experienced little 
or no delay, while the trains in the last bin experienced the greatest delay.  Curves showing the 
 91
cumulative percentage of total trains as a function of delay length are also provided to illustrate 
the increase in variability. 
6.7.1 Length of In-Service Failure and Variability 
The first factor I analyzed was the length of ISF.  To evaluate the effect of this factor, I 
chose simulations using the single-track route at the highest simulated traffic volume (52 T/D, or 
192 ANMGT).  Although this traffic volume is higher than most single-track operations, use of 
exaggerated conditions in the simulations enabled better understanding of the relative impacts of 
ISF length on mainline capacity.  In the previous sections, total delay was calculated by 
subtracting the delay for 1, 3, and 5-hour ISFs from the base case.  In this analysis, I compared 
the frequency of delay for ISFs with that of the base case (0hr ISF) to show changes in train 
delay variability.  Thus, train delay for this analysis is defined as the difference between the 
minimum, or unopposed, run time and the actual time it takes a train to traverse the route 
(Dingler et al. 2009).  Given this definition, over 60 percent of the trains in the base case 
experience between 30 and 60 minutes of delay (Figure 6.6). 
As the length of ISF increases from 0 to 5 hours, both average train delay and the 
variability in delay increase.  For the various lengths of ISF, the distribution shifts from a skewed 
distribution to more symmetrical, with the modal value increasing (i.e. shifting to the right) as 
the length of delay increases.  For the base case, most trains experience 30-60 minutes of delay 
(per 100 train miles), while for a 5-hour ISF, the modal value increases to 120-150 minutes.  In 
addition, the distribution curves become wider and shorter for longer ISFs, indicating an increase 
in variance.  This increase in variance affects a railroad’s level of service because when a higher 
percentage of trains are delayed, more customers are affected, resulting in greater potential costs 
to the railroad. 
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For double-track routes, the increases in average delay and variability are not as evident.  
I analyzed the same double-track route described previously, again using the highest simulated 
traffic volume (126 T/D, 465 ANMGT).  Since there is less total delay on the double-track route, 
I used 10-minute frequency bins instead of the 30-minute bins used in Figure 6.6.  The data show 
that for a 1-hour ISF, 90 percent of the trains experience little or no effect (i.e. 0 to 10 minutes of 
delay) and less than 1 percent of the trains are delayed for more than 40 minutes (Figure 6.7a).  
However, for a 5-hour ISF, only 46 percent of the trains experience little to no effect, and over 
20 percent of the trains experience a delay greater than 40 minutes.  Thus, the longer the ISF, the 
greater the number of trains affected.  
In order to see the distributions of train delay more clearly, I replotted the data without 
the 0 to 10 minutes bin and adjusted the scale of the vertical axis (Figure 6.7b).  For 1 and 3-hour 
ISFs, the frequency of delays decreases as the length of delay increases.  However, the 5-hour 
ISF case had a different distribution in which the number of trains experiencing longer delays 
increased.  These data suggest that when a service outage exceeds a certain threshold, the 
shockwave affecting the network becomes larger and more unpredictable.  Thus, although the 
effects are not as pronounced as in the single-track route, the length of service outage does affect 













































Figure 6.7 Frequency Diagrams Showing the Amount of Delay For Each Train (a) and For Trains 
Experiencing Delays Greater Than 10 minutes (b) Due to Various ISFs on a Double-Track Route 





6.7.2 Traffic Volume and Variability 
 
The second factor I considered was traffic volume.  I analyzed RTC data for a 5-hour ISF 
on both the single and double-track routes, with traffic volumes ranging from 16 to 52 T/D and 
64 to 126 T/D, respectively (Figures 6.8 and 6.9).  Similar to the impact of ISF length, increased 
traffic volume also results in increased variability in train delay.  As before, the distribution 
curves for the single-track data shift to the right and become wider and shorter as traffic volume 























Figure 6.8 Frequency Diagram Showing the Amount of Train Delay for Each Train Due to a 5-Hour 
ISF on a Single-Track Route With Varying Traffic Volumes 
 
 
Data for the double-track route are presented in Figure 6.9.  The impact of traffic volume 
on train delay is less apparent on the double-track route, due to its higher line capacity.  
However, it is clear that average train delay and train delay variability do increase at higher 

















































Figure 6.9 Frequency Diagrams Showing Amount of Train Delay For Each Train (a) and For Trains 
Experiencing a Delay Greater Than 10 Minutes (b) Due to a 5-Hour ISF on a Double-Track Route 
With Varying Traffic Volumes 
 
For very high traffic volumes (i.e. above 82 T/D, or 302 ANMGT), the train frequency 
distributions (Figure 6.9b) follow the same trend as in Figure 6.7b. The number of trains delayed 
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decreases until the length of individual train delay reaches approximately 70 minutes, and then 
begins to increase.  As before, when traffic volumes exceed a certain threshold, the shockwave 
affecting the network becomes larger and more unpredictable.  Therefore, the mechanical 
reliability of freight cars becomes more important at higher traffic levels.  Although this is true 
for double-track, its impact is much greater on single-track routes.  
6.8  Conclusions  
The effectiveness of railcar condition monitoring has a large impact on rail transportation 
efficiency.  I used dispatch simulation software to analyze the effect of ISF duration and traffic 
volume on single and double-track versions of a hypothetical route to estimate delay.  The 
simulations indicated that both traffic volume and length of ISF had a nonlinear effect on delay, 
with traffic volume having an exponential effect.  These associated costs may be higher than 
previously estimated, especially for high traffic volumes.  Based on RTC simulations, the 
estimated cost of direct waste due to these mainline delays is approximately $37 million per year 
for US Class I railroads.  Although train delay costs due to ISFs are not often considered in 
economic analyses of ACMT systems, they are substantial in comparison to the track and 
equipment damages associated with derailments (Chapter 2).  Another factor not often 
considered is the large variability in train delay at high traffic volumes.  When variability 
increases, there is a higher probability that more trains will experience longer delays, resulting in 
indirect waste in the form of increased time buffers.  Although the costs due to variability are 
more difficult to quantify, this negatively affects the level of service that railroads can offer their 
customers.  Therefore, additional failure costs associated with train delay can be recovered by 
improving railcar inspection and maintenance practices and reducing the likelihood of 
equipment-caused mainline ISFs.  
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CHAPTER 7: MACHINE VISION CONDITION MONITORING OF HEAVY-AXLE 
LOAD RAILCAR STRUCTURAL UNDERFRAME COMPONENTS         
(In Press, Proceedings of the Institution of Mechanical Engineers, Part F: Journal of Rail and 
Rapid Transit, 2010) 
 
7.1  Introduction 
There are approximately 1.6 million freight cars (wagons) operating in the North 
American railroad network and they are subject to wide ranging forms of wear and damage while 
in service (AAR 2008).  The United States Department of Transportation (US DOT) Federal 
Railroad Administration (FRA) regulations require a car inspector or train crew member to 
inspect every car placed in a train before that train may depart from a yard or terminal (US DOT 
2008).  The current railcar inspection process is tedious, labor intensive, and relies on personnel 
with varying degrees of experience and training who must perform their tasks under a wide range 
of environmental conditions.   Additionally, there is currently no practical means of recording 
and retaining inspection information unless a billable repair is required.  This makes it difficult to 
track the condition of an individual railcar’s components over time, thereby preventing trend 
analyses and predictive maintenance.  As a result, US railways have progressively moved away 
from reactive maintenance to planned and scheduled component replacement in order to improve 
efficiency and reduce costs (Lundgren and Killian 2005).  Consequently, the Association of 
American Railroads (AAR) and the Transportation Technology Center, Inc. (TTCI) initiated the 
Advanced Technology Safety Initiative (ATSI) and a program called Technology Driven Train 
Inspection (TDTI) to develop and implement automated inspection technologies (Hawthorne et 
al. 2005, Tournay and Cummings 2005, and Robeda and Kalay 2008).  
 The objective of ATSI and TDTI is to provide safer, more efficient, and traceable means 
of rolling stock inspection by automating the mechanical inspection process through a variety of 
technologies.  Examples of these technologies include wheel impact load detectors (WILDs), 
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truck (bogie) performance detectors (TPDs), acoustic bearing detectors (ABDs), and machine 
vision inspection of truck components, safety appliances, and brake shoes (Hart et al. 2004, 
Barke and Chiu 2005, Hawthorne et al. 2005, Lundgren and Killian 2005, Ahuja and Barkan 
2007, Edwards et al. 2007, Freid et al. 2007, Hart et al. 2008, Robeda and Kalay 2008, Ouyang et 
al. 2009, and Railway Age 2009).  The plan for TDTI is to implement an integrated network of 
automatic wayside (lineside) systems capable of inspecting and monitoring the North American 
freight car fleet with two principal objectives.  The first goal is to cost-effectively maintain 
compliance with FRA regulations and railroad-specific maintenance and operational standards 
and the second is to improve the overall effectiveness and efficiency of the railcar inspection and 
maintenance process. 
 In order for TDTI to provide substantial improvement to the inspection process, each 
component and system on the railcar must be addressed.  If not, railcars and trains will still need 
to stop in order to manually inspect the components excluded from automated inspection.  An 
automated system that only addresses a limited selection of inspection tasks, or only inspects 
certain cars, would offer incremental and qualitative benefits, but it may not provide sufficient 
savings to cost justify the investment in these expensive technologies (Ouyang et al. 2009).  
Consequently, the final wayside inspection systems should be comprehensive in scope, 
inspecting as many aspects of the car as possible (Railway Age 2009).  In addition to the wide 
variety of components requiring inspection, there are also many variations in the nature of 
component defects, symptoms of interest, and the required means of ascertaining component 
condition.  As a result, the requisite technologies capable of addressing these inspection demands 
must vary in design and application.  The AAR has initiated research and development on a 
variety of different automated inspection technologies that will address many aspects of the 
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federally mandated freight car inspections including brake application and release verification, 
brake shoe thickness measurement, safety appliance condition inspection, wheel defect 
inspection, and wheel profile measurement (Lundgren and Killian 2005, Robeda and Kalay 
2008, and Hart et al. 2004). 
7. 2 Background 
7.2.1  Structural Underframe Components  
One component of the TDTI initiative is the development of a system known as 
Automated Inspection of Structural Components (AISC) that will use cameras and computer-
aided image-search methods to inspect freight car underframes.  Steel structural underframe 
components contribute to the structural integrity of the railcar by supporting the car body and 
lading and transmitting longitudinal buff and draft forces (slack action) within the train.  On 
many types of freight cars the principal structural member of the underframe is the center sill, 
extending longitudinally along the center from one end of the car to the other.  The center sill is 
the largest element in the underframe structure, supporting vertical loads and also transmitting 
the majority of buff and draft forces through the car (Kratville 1997).  In addition to the center 
sill, several other components are needed to support vertical, longitudinal, static, and dynamic 
loads while the car is in transit.  These components include sidesills, body bolsters, and 
crossbearers.  Some cars also have smaller cross members (sometimes called crossties) and 
smaller longitudinal members known as stringers or floor supports.  Unlike other underframe 
structural members, neither crossties nor stringers bear substantial loads.  The sidesills are 
longitudinal members running along each side of the car.  They are connected to the center sill 
by various cross members that run transversely from the sidesills to the center sill.  The two body 
bolsters are the largest of these transverse members and are located near each end of the car.  
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Besides their role as major transverse members of the underframe structure, they support the car 
body atop its trucks (bogies).  Crossbearers (and crossties) are additional transverse members 
connecting the sidesills to the center sill and further help to distribute and support vertical loads.  
All of these components combine to form a structural system that maintains the car’s camber and 
structural integrity. 
7.2.1.1 Structural Underframe Defects 
Freight car structural underframe components are subject to cyclic loading, shock, and 
vibration while in service.  Cyclic longitudinal loading, also called slack action, occurs in the 
form of buff and draft forces.  The majority of these forces are absorbed by a car’s draft system, 
but extreme loading in buff (compression) or draft (tension) must be absorbed by the center sill 
and the accompanying structural components.  Lateral cyclic loading occurs in curves as 
centripetal forces generate higher loads on one side of the railcar.  A portion of these loads are 
carried by the sidesill and transferred to the center sill through the crossbearers.  Damage and 
repeated loading and unloading can lead to fatigue-crack growth and ultimately result in fracture 
of structural members.  When cars are overloaded or loaded unevenly, cyclic forces en route are 
higher, exacerbating fatigue stresses.  In addition to cyclic loading, railcars are also subject to 
periodic “shocks” as a result of loading or coupling practices or track geometry deviations, 
which can lead to structural component defects.  Examples may include: dropping lading into a 
gondola car rather than slowly lowering it or excessive coupling impact speeds during switching 
or classification yard operation.  Due to these potential sources of structural component damage, 
the FRA and railroad mechanical department practices require railcar underframes to be 
regularly inspected to ensure the safe and efficient operation of rolling stock. 
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7.2.1.2 Structural Underframe Inspection 
Due to the robust nature of railcar designs, frequent inspections, and AAR mechanical 
standards, serious problems with the structural elements are unusual and failures are rare.  
However, when failures do occur, they pose a high risk of causing a derailment.  As a result, 
FRA mechanical regulations require the inspection of center sills for breaks, cracks, and 
buckling, and the inspection of sidesills, crossbearers, and body bolsters for breaks, as well as 
other selected inspection items (US DOT 2008).  To detect defects in all of these structural 
elements with certainty, a car inspector must walk around the entire car, carefully looking 
beneath it (often with the aid of a flashlight) to adequately view each structural component.  
North American freight trains average approximately 70 cars in length (AAR 2008) and are often 
over 100 cars long.  Each car typically receives about 1-2 minutes for either in-bound or 
outbound mechanical inspections.  Under these conditions, defects that are not easily seen may 
go undetected.  Cars are typically inspected with the level of scrutiny necessary to detect 
structural component problems only when entering a railcar repair shop for major repairs.  
Machine vision technology for inspection of underframe components offers the possibility for 
inspections to be performed more efficiently and effectively, hence the rail industry’s interest in 
development of the AISC system. 
7.2.2 Machine Vision Technology  
A machine vision system acquires data using digital cameras, organizes and analyzes the 
images using computer algorithms, and produces useful information, such as the type and 
location of defects.  Machine vision algorithms use visual cues to locate areas of interest on the 
freight car and then analyze each component to determine its variance from the baseline case 
(Lundgren and Killian 2005, Barke and Chiu 2005, and Hart et al. 2004).  AISC will work 
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collectively with other automated systems, leading to railcar inspections that are more efficient, 
effective and objective than current human-vision inspections.  By storing digital inspection data, 
it will be possible to maintain historical health records for each car that undergoes inspection.  
Maintaining these records will enable condition monitoring of structural elements over time, 
allowing the repair of defects or damaged components to be appropriately scheduled prior to an 
in-service failure.  As a result, applying machine vision technology to the railcar inspection 
process has the potential to enhance rolling stock maintenance efficiency and safety. 
 A primary benefit of machine vision and other automated inspection systems is the 
facilitation of predictive, or condition-based, maintenance.  Condition-based maintenance (CBM) 
involves monitoring certain parameters related to component health or degradation and taking 
corrective action prior to component failure (Lagnebäck 2007).  Despite the advantages of CBM, 
current railcar structural component repair and billing practices encourage reactive maintenance 
to correct extant defects, rather than prevention of incipient failures.  One of the reasons for this 
is the lack of cost-effective technology and infrastructure to conduct thorough inspections of 
many railcar elements, especially underframes.  Due to the reactive nature of corrective 
maintenance, repairs cannot be effectively planned, resulting in higher maintenance expenses 
and less efficient repairs.  For example, it is more economical to patch a cracked crossbearer 
before it breaks than to replace a fully broken crossbearer.  Having recognized the need for 
CBM, railroads have begun implementing other technologies similar to AISC that monitor 
various indicators of railcar component health (e.g. TPDs and the AAR’s Fully Automated Car 
Train Inspection System - FactISTM) (Barke and Chiu 2005, Tournay and Cummings 2005, and 
Ouyang et al. 2009). 
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7.2.3 Previous Machine Vision Research 
Among the earliest research and development in North America on the use of machine 
vision for railroad inspection tasks was the work conducted by Conrail who developed a system 
to detect low-hanging air hoses in the 1990s (Steets and Tse 1998).  Since then, research on use 
of machine vision for a variety of other railroad inspection tasks has been conducted, including 
work sponsored by the AAR, FRA, BNSF Railway, US DOT Region V Regional University 
Transportation (i.e. NEXTRANS) Center, and the Transportation Research Board (TRB) High-
Speed Rail IDEA Program (Hart et al. 2004, Lundgren and Killian 2005, Ahuja and Barkan 
2007, Berry et al. 2007, Edwards et al. 2007, Freid et al. 2007, Lai et al. 2007, Berry et al. 2008, 
Hart et al. 2008). 
 The University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign (UIUC) has conducted several railroad 
machine vision research projects that have been an interdisciplinary collaboration between the 
Railroad Engineering Program in the Department of Civil and Environmental Engineering and 
the Computer Vision and Robotics Laboratory at the Beckman Institute for Advanced Science 
and Technology.  The first of these was a project investigating wayside inspection of railcar 
truck components (Hart et al. 2004).  The experimental setup used a perpendicular view of the 
truck with respect to the track, and algorithms were developed to both detect the locations of 
brake components and spring sets and identify missing bearing end cap bolts.  This research 
provided a basis for subsequent research on the Automated Safety Appliance Inspection System 
(ASAIS) (Edwards et al. 2007).  ASAIS detects deformed ladders, handholds, and brake wheels 
and uses visual learning techniques to determine the difference between FRA defects needing 
immediate attention and deformations that are less critical.  The results and methods developed 
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in these projects have been incorporated into the AAR’s TDTI program and are currently being 
developed by technology companies and adopted by railroads for field testing. 
 Subsequent UIUC research demonstrated the feasibility of using machine vision to detect 
defects and other anomalies on the underbodies of passenger cars and locomotives (Freid et al. 
2007, Ahuja and Barkan 2007, Hart et al. 2008).  Image acquisition and machine vision 
techniques were developed to record images and inspect rolling stock and locomotive 
undercarriages.  Algorithms using images captured in both the visible and the infrared spectra 
demonstrated that missing, damaged, or overheated components could be detected as well as 
incipient failures and foreign objects beneath the cars.  Videos of trains were recorded as they 
moved over a stationary camera mounted between the rails in a repair pit beneath the tracks.  The 
combination of information from both the thermal and the visible spectra identified certain 
defects that might have otherwise gone unnoticed by human inspectors in the course of routine 
visual inspections.  This research addressed some of the problems associated with acquiring 
images from beneath a railcar: an inherently challenging location due to lighting requirements, 
space constraints, and difficulties involved with keeping the equipment clean and protected.  
Hardware, algorithms, and technical methodologies for image acquisition developed in these 
earlier projects were adapted and expanded to develop a system for machine vision inspection of 
freight car underframes in the AISC project described in this article. 
7.2.4 Regulatory Compliance 
The FRA regulations for freight car inspection formed the basis for determining which 
components would be inspected by AISC.  Section 215.121 of Title 49 in the U.S. Code of 
Federal Regulations (CFR) governs the inspection of freight car bodies and two of the six parts 
in this section pertain to the inspection of structural components (US DOT 2008b).  According to 
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the FRA regulations, the center sill may not be broken, cracked more than 15.24 cm (6 in), or 
bent/buckled more than 6.35 cm (2.5 in) in any 1.83 m (6 ft) length.  Specific parameters are 
established for the allowable magnitude of cracks and buckling because these defects may 
undermine the integrity of the center sill, resulting in a failure (US DOT 2008b).  Therefore, 
these regulations are intended to identify potentially hazardous cars so that they will be repaired 
before an in-service failure.  During FRA motive power and equipment (MP&E) inspections, 
inspectors have multiple enforcement options.  The inspector may take exception to the condition 
of a structural component and issue a warning to the operating railroad of possible monetary 
penalties if the defect is not repaired immediately.  When deemed necessary, inspectors can also 
issue violations having monetary penalties ranging from $2,500 to $6,000 depending on the type, 
severity, and location of the defect (US DOT 2008b).  
7.2.5 Research Focus 
In order to determine which structural elements should have the highest priority among 
AISC inspection tasks, railcar inspection data from the FRA Office of Safety were analyzed for 
the time period of 2000 to 2007.  Inspection data pertaining only to railcar underframe 
components were considered in this analysis.  Fifty-nine percent of all structural component 
defects identified by FRA MP&E inspectors, were broken, cracked, bent, or buckled center sills, 




Figure 7.1 Average Number of Annual Structural Underframe Defects Recorded by FRA MP&E 
Inspectors (2000-2007) 
  
 These data suggest that defects in the center sill are the most frequent type among freight 
car structural underframe components.  This is consistent with FRA train accident data from 
1999 to 2008.  Over this 10-year period, bent or broken center sills were responsible for 75 train 
accidents on US Class I railroads in comparison to only 31 accidents due to broken side sills and 
only one accident due to a defective body bolster (US DOT 2009).  Given the importance of 
center sills in providing load bearing capacity and their role in transmitting buff and draft forces, 
the consequence of center sill failures are higher than other structural components.  Fines 
assessed by FRA inspectors due to a broken center sill are among the highest of those listed in 
CFR 215.121, matched only by violations due to loose or broken axles.  Risk is typically defined 
as the product of frequency (or probability) and consequence (Glickman and Gough 1990).  
Center sill defects are more frequent and have higher consequences than other structural 
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components, thus the risk associated with center sill failure is the highest among railcar structural 
components.  Therefore, the inspection of center sills is a primary focus of AISC and of this 
research. 
7. 3 Methodology 
7.3.1 Preliminary Image Acquisition 
The initial stage of this research focused on collecting images of representative railcar 
structural components.  Preliminary tests were conducted at the Monticello Railway Museum in 
Monticello, IL on a 1950-era AAR-standard-design hopper car.  The basic data recording system 
was adapted from UIUC's previous passenger car inspection research (Freid et al. 2007, Ahuja 
and Barkan 2007, Hart et al. 2008).  Camera and lighting equipment were mounted, facing 
upward, on the floor of a three-foot-deep inspection pit, and connected to a laptop computer 
adjacent to the pit.  Eight halogen lights were arranged in a circle with the camera in the center 
and were manually adjusted in order to provide proper illumination of the railcar’s center sill.  
Experiments were conducted in which the car was rolled over the pit track at various speeds, and 
images were recorded under various levels of light intensity.  A panoramic image was developed 
using image data from the best (i.e. most clearly visible) trial.  Using previously developed 
panoramic image creation algorithms, the central portions of each consecutive video frame were 
extracted and appended together to form a complete image of the entire railcar underbody (Freid 
et al. 2007) (Figure 7.2).   
 
 




 The resulting panorama provided initial confidence in the feasibility of this method of 
automated structural component inspection.  Several critical structural underframe components, 
including the center sill and crossbearers, are clearly visible in the panoramic image as well as 
other mechanical components such as the couplers, draft gear, truck bolsters, brake rigging, 
brake beam, interior springs in each spring nest, and axles.  Results from these tests identified 
specific areas for improvement, including better illumination of the recessed portions of the 
underframe most distant from the camera (e.g. the tops of the hoppers). 
7.3.2 Data Collection 
After analyzing preliminary image acquisition results, a more precise experimental setup 
was developed using an additional camera (Figure 7.3a), and data collection procedures were 
defined.  This equipment arrangement was used during testing at the Norfolk Southern (NS) 
locomotive repair facility in Decatur, IL (Figure 7.3b).  
  
            
(a)       (b) 
Figure 7.3 Diagram of Equipment Setup With Measurements in Meters (a) and Locomotive Repair 
Pit Used for Data Collection (b) 
 
 109
The test set-up included two cameras placed below the rails.  In an arrangement similar to 
the setup used at Monticello, Camera 1 was located 1.65 m (65 in) below the top of rail, centered 
between the two rails and aimed straight upward, 90º from horizontal (Figure 7.3a).  The video-
image collection system for this camera view was a Dragonfly 2 camera recording at 15 frames 
per second, with a 4.8mm lens and an f/1.8 aperture.  Illumination was provided by eight 575W 
(115V) halogen lights, each with parabolic reflectors and medium flood lenses.  The lights were 
oriented on the floor of the pit in a circle around the camera, and the intensity of each light could 
be individually adjusted.  Using a handheld light meter, the maximum luminous intensity of each 
light was determined to be 40,900 lx (3,880 foot candles at a distance of 3 ft.).  The lights were 
aimed upward but adjusted inwardly at various angles to provide even illumination of the 
camera’s entire field of view.  Half of the lights were oriented to illuminate the center sill, 
whereas, the other four lights were positioned at higher angles (closer to 90º vertically) in order 
to illuminate the more distant portions of the underbody (i.e. the top sections of the hoppers).  
 Camera 2 was positioned 1.22 m (48 in) from the field side of the rail, 0.76 m (30 in) 
below the top of rail, oriented perpendicular to the track and aimed upward 45º above horizontal 
(Figure 7.3a).  Equipment for this camera view included a Marlin camera recording at 15 frames 
per second and a 6mm lens with an f/1.4 aperture.  Four individually adjustable halogen lights 
(with the same specifications as those used for Camera 1) provided illumination for Camera 2, 
each oriented at approximately 45 degrees above horizontal.  Tests were run using two NS 
gondola cars and one NS covered hopper car by rolling them past the cameras at 5-8 km/h (3-5 
mph).  Fourteen different videos were recorded during testing, and the image data were 
converted into panoramic images (Figure 7.4).  Since the two gondola cars were almost identical 




Figure 7.4 Panoramic Images of Hopper Car (a & c) and Gondola Car (b & d) From  
Camera 1 (a & b) and Camera 2 (c & d) 
 
Results from the testing at Decatur show much more even illumination for the covered 
hopper car image (Figure 7.4a) compared to the previously recorded hopper car panorama 
(Figure 7.2).  The panorama of the gondola underbody (Figure 7.4b) provides a clear view of the 
center sill, crossbearers and crossties (thinner lateral members between the crossbearers).  Other 
components of the gondola that are clearly visible include the brake reservoir, brake cylinder and 
the entire foundation of the braking system.  In order to determine the resolution of the 
panoramic images, engineering drawings were acquired from NS for each of the cars that were 
tested.  By measuring certain components in the panoramic image in pixels and dividing by the 
actual lengths of those components, the pixel-to-cm ratio (i.e. the image resolution) was 
determined to be 3.03 pixels per centimeter (~7.8 pixels per inch).  Each panoramic image was 
developed by combining the center strips of over 400 video frames, with each strip having a 


















 The panoramas from Camera 2 are much longer due to the fact that this camera was 
located closer to the track than Camera 1.  As a result, the images in Figure 7.4c and 7.4d only 
represent one half of each railcar.  The images from this camera view are valuable because 
cracks or breaks in the side of the center sill would be visible from this angle.  This view can also 
be used to inspect the camber of the car, to determine whether the center sill is sagging or 
deformed.  
7.4 Data Analysis 
7.4.1 Multiscale Image Segmentation 
Given a panoramic image of the car underframe, algorithms must detect and localize the 
center sill in the image and inspect it for two types of defects: (i) deformation caused by bending 
and/or buckling and (ii) the presence of breaks or cracks.  The nature of the two types of defects 
being considered necessitates the development of a multiscale analysis approach, where defect 
search functions are performed at various scales, or levels, of image segmentation.  The area 
occupied by the center sill differs significantly in size compared to the area encompassing a 
crack.  As a result, the detection of the center sill requires analysis of large pixel neighborhoods, 
whereas, the detection of breaks and cracks requires analysis of higher-resolution image details.  
A computationally efficient strategy capable of addressing these two image-analysis extremes is 
known as multiscale image segmentation (Ahuja 1996, Tabb and Ahuja 1997, Arora and Ahuja 
2006).  Multiscale image segmentation provides access to pixel neighborhoods of varying size, 
which can be further used for detection and inspection of the center sill for defects.  
The machine vision algorithm requires the following steps:  
1. Using pixel values present in the image, parse the panorama into homogeneous-
intensity regions at all degrees of inter-region versus intra-region homogeneity. 
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2. Analyze regions obtained at the coarsest scale (showing limited detail) to detect 
the center sill by using a known model (e.g. a rectangular shaped object located at 
the center of the panoramic image). 
3. Inspect the contours of the image regions that identify the center sill to measure 
their deviation from the model, thus determining the degree of center sill bending 
and/or buckling. 
4. Recursively analyze sub-regions at different scales of the segmentation, from fine 
to coarse, to detect cracks or breaks in the center sill.  Use models developed from 
example images containing cracks or breaks (e.g. a crack typically appears in the 
image as an elongated, dark region that represents a discontinuity in brightness). 
 
This recursive analysis is feasible due to the multiscale image-segmentation algorithm 
previously developed at UIUC and noted in step one (Ahuja 1996, Tabb and Ahuja 1997, Arora 
and Ahuja 2006).  In this case, object detection immediately produces object segmentation since 
region boundaries generally coincide with boundaries of an object present in the image (i.e. 
detection of the center sill in step 2 simultaneously delineates its boundaries, and thus localizes 
its position in the image).  Similar to center sill detection, the identification of cracks and breaks 
in the center sill is based on models of these defects.  Identification of a crack or break 
simultaneously localizes its position, orientation, and length, and this information can be used to 
evaluate the magnitude of the discovered defect. 
 The segmentation algorithm partitions the image into homogeneous regions of previously 
unknown shape, size, gray-level contrast, and topological context.  A region is perceived to be 
homogeneous if variations in pixel intensity within the region are smaller than intensity 
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variations of its surroundings, regardless of its absolute degree of variability.  Consequently, 
image segmentation may be performed at a range of homogeneity values (Figure 7.5).   
 
Figure 7.5 Multiscale Segmentation Hierarchy of Hopper Car Image Showing Car Underframe With 
the Segmentation Scale Increasing (i.e. Becoming More Coarse) From Top to Bottom 
 
At any scale, recursive segmentation may be performed to extract finer scale segments 
characterized by an increasing degree of homogeneity.  This process continues until one obtains 
strictly constant intensity regions, yielding a multiscale segmentation of the image.  The black 
pixels form the boundary lines of the segmented regions.  As the scale increases, smaller regions 
strictly merge to form a larger region, meaning that the segmentation algorithm is hierarchical.  
The same multiscale segmentation algorithm can also be used for simultaneous inspection of 
other structural components in addition to the center sill.  For example, analyzing the image 
segmentation at a finer scale than that used for center sill inspection, crossbearers can also be 




7.4.2 Center Sill Inspection 
The center sill is the largest and single most critical structural component in the railcar 
underbody; therefore its correct identification and inspection is the highest priority of the AISC 
inspection tasks.  The consistency of the camera orientation and panorama development 
techniques allow one to hypothesize that the center sill: (1) is centrally located in the 
corresponding panorama, (2) appears as a rectangle with possible embedded patterns within the 
rectangle, and (3) contains two long parallel edges that lie along two horizontal image rows.  
Therefore, the center sill can be modeled as a large, rectangular-shaped object, prominently 
featured at the center of the panoramic image.  A template is developed based on the model 
parameters above or made from averaging templates created from panoramic images from cars 
of the same type.  Then, starting with the coarsest levels of the segmentation hierarchy, the 
template is matched to the segmentation image to find the central location of the center sill 
between the wheelsets (Figure 7.6a). 
 
Figure 7.6 Center Sill Detection Using the Coarsest-Scale Segmentation (a) and Center Sill 
Boundary Identification Using Finer Scale Segmentation (b) (Colors Have Been Modified for 
Document Reproduction Purposes) 
 
 Once identified, the matching edges are interpreted as contours of the center sill.  These 
identified edges also indicate the general direction in which the center sill extends across the 










partially occluded, and other parts appear in the cluttered areas around the railcar truck (bogie).  
These parts cannot be directly detected using the aforementioned strategy.  Therefore, the 
detected edges must be used to guide an additional search for the remaining portions of the 
center sill.  It is assumed that the amount of possible deformation of the partially occluded parts 
is relatively small, so these portions of the center sill should occur in the vicinity of the 
previously identified general direction of the sill.  The remaining visible parts can then be 
detected by analyzing a finer-scale segmentation and identifying the edges that lie along the 
general direction of the center sill.  Nearby segmentation boundary pixels are identified to fill in 
missing parts of the center sill contour (Figure 7.6b). 
 Given that the camera view is along the surface perpendicular to and directly below the 
center of the car, the known physical width of the center sill in the scene can be immediately 
mapped to the number of pixels associated with this width in the image.  This mapping technique 
serves to calibrate the measurement of deformation of the center sill in the image.  The average 
error of identified contours of the center sill using multiscale segmentation is two pixels, which 
corresponds to about 0.66 cm (one pixel corresponds to 0.33 cm, or 0.13 in).  Improved camera 
resolution should further reduce this error.  Additional errors could be generated by lateral 
motion of the train when passing the AISC system.  These errors were not witnessed during 
testing, however, they could be remedied, should they prove to be a problem.  By maintaining a 
tight track gauge and using guardrails that force the wheel flange against the gauge side of the 
rail at the inspection site, lateral motion could be substantially reduced or eliminated.  
7.4.3 Pixel Summation 
An alternative, less computationally intensive method can also be used to find the 
location of the center sill.  This method, based on pixel summation, is carried out by summing 
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the pixels longitudinally for each row of the segmented image (or edge image) of the car 
panorama.  The number of pixels along each horizontal row is computed from the edge image 
(Figure 7.7a).  Long, straight sections in the panoramic image will appear as prominent peaks in 
the histogram of the pixel summation (Figure 7.8a). 
Since the center sill creates the longest edges in the panoramic image, the two largest 
peaks (a and f in Figure 7.8a) correspond to the outer contours of the center sill, while the four 
interior peaks (b - e in Figure 7.8a) in the histogram correspond to the inner contours of the 
center sill (see Figure 7.8b).  The outer contours along the length of the center sill are then 
denoted with white parallel lines (Figure 7.7b and Figure 7.8b).  These detected edges can then 
be used to guide the search for the remaining parts of the center sill as described in the previous 
method.  Once the contours of the center sill are identified, they are compared with the ideal 
template.  Any deviation from the parallel lines is interpreted as deformation.  This method can 











Figure 7.7 Edge Image of Gondola Car Underbody Panorama (a) and Original Panorama With 



































Figure 7.8 Histogram of the Pixel Summations Belonging to Center Sill Region Boundaries, With 
the Row Index of the Image on the Horizontal Axis and the Proportion of Strong Edges on the 
Vertical Axis (a); (b) is a Close-Up of Figure 7.7b, Showing the Edges (a - f) Corresponding to (a) 
 
Additionally, using the panoramas from Camera 2 (Figure 7.4c and 7.4d), the same 
methods described above can be utilized to identify the location of the center sill from the side of 
the car.  Using pixel summation, the bottom edge of the center sill can be identified and 
inspected for breaks or bends.  As a result, the AISC system will detect whether or not the center 
sill maintains appropriate camber and could determine if a car has been overloaded to the point 
of causing the center sill to deform.  Pixel summation provides detection and inspection 
flexibility with reduced computational requirements but does not provide the same level of 

























7.4.4 Inspection of Cracks and Breaks 
The image region identified as the center sill will be analyzed to detect the presence of 
cracks and breaks.  This phase of work is still in preliminary stages, but a multiscale process has 
been proposed as a potential approach to this aspect of inspection.  Both cracks and breaks can 
be modeled as distinct objects that may occur in the image area occupied by the center sill.  A 
crack can be modeled as a homogeneous, elongated region that appears darker than the center 
sill.  Similarly, a break can be modeled as a dark region that represents a discontinuity in the 
following properties of the center sill: brightness, contiguity of the sill’s contours, and co-
linearity and parallelism with parts of the center sill’s contours. 
 The algorithm will first identify the region that delineates the boundary of the center sill 
(Figure 7.6a).  To identify breaks and cracks, a multi-scale search strategy will be used that 
recursively searches smaller subregions embedded in the region occupied by the center sill.  At 
each segmentation scale, the regions found will be compared to the models developed for breaks 










  (a) (b) (c) 
 
  (d) (e) (f) 
 
Figure 7.9 Original Digital Image of a Cracked Center Sill, Provided Courtesy of AAR (a) and Fine 
to Coarse Segmentation Images (b-f), Showing the Crack at Various Segmentation Levels 
 
If any of these subregions exhibit properties defined by the models, they will be 
considered as potential cracks or breaks.  In addition to detection, the AISC system will also be 
able to identify the position, orientation, length and other characteristics of cracks and breaks and 
thus assess the degree of damage.  Since cracks, in general, appear at finer resolutions of the 
image, their detection is expected to be more difficult than breaks; however, preliminary field 
data indicate that it will be feasible. 
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7.5  Discussion  
The ultimate goal for an automated machine vision railcar inspection system is one that 
can inspect railcars using a series of integrated wayside cameras, including the AISC cameras 
located below the track.  Through automated inspections, freight cars will be inspected more 
thoroughly and potential risks associated with manual car inspection minimized.  A completely 
functional AISC will be capable of inspecting the underframes of an entire train of cars moving 
at mainline speeds, identifying areas of concern and reporting the suspected defects to railroad 
inspection personnel for further review or repair at terminals ahead.  After implementing 
algorithms for structural component inspection, AISC will provide a basis for future systems 
capable of addressing other mechanical component defects visible from the bottom of the car 
(e.g. missing knuckle pins, broken or missing coupler retaining pins and broken train line 
trolleys). 
 In addition to the goals of TDTI, there are other advantages afforded by the use of this 
technology.  The collection of high-quality images of railcar components, even without the use 
of machine vision and computer-aided defect detection, can provide benefits to the railroad 
industry.  For example, a car inspector could be stationed in an office with the task of manually 
inspecting the digital images of railcar underbodies, as trains pass the inspection site.  If used in 
this manner, benefits could be immediately realized, as car inspectors would have a much clearer 
and more comprehensive view of railcar underbodies than is currently possible.  In addition, the 
collection of high-quality images of railcar underframes would also be helpful for security and 
liability purposes, as AISC could provide railroads the ability to detect “non-standard features” 
including contraband or explosive devices (Lundgren and Killian 2005).   These images would 
also provide historical documentation of railcar underbody condition that has not been previously 
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available.  As machine vision systems develop further, software could be integrated to aid the 
human inspector by highlighting potential defects visible in the images.  Models of humans and 
machines have been used to develop similar hybrid automation systems for other industries, 
which typically perform better than either humans or machines alone (Chi and Drury 2001 and 
Hou et al. 1993).  In this way, railroads could benefit from the increased speed of an automated 
system while improving the quality of human decision making.   
 Finally, the use of automated inspection systems will eliminate wasted effort by allowing 
car inspectors to spend less time inspecting cars and dedicate more time to the value-adding task 
of making repairs.  This will result in reduced inspection times and will potentially add capacity 
to receiving and departure tracks, thus improving the efficiency of an entire terminal (Edwards 
2006).  As a result of the benefits in terminals, these technologies may also improve overall 
railroad network efficiency, since average train speed and service reliability are greatly 
dependant on terminal dwell (Martland et al. 1992, Kwon et al. 1995, Murray 2002, Dirnberger 
2006, Logan 2006, Dirnberger and Barkan 2007).  In order to improve yard and terminal 
efficiency most effectively, all freight car inspection tasks will need to be automated.  Since a 
railcar’s physical features (including underframes) vary substantially among car types, extensive 
testing will be required to ensure appropriate inspection accuracy and minimal false alarm rates.  
Machine vision inspection capabilities will initially be most applicable to unit trains (i.e. those 
containing cars of nearly uniform design) due to the fact that component image templates (e.g. 
the shape of the center sill) will be consistent for the entire train.  After successfully integrating 
this technology in unit train operations, the use of machine vision underframe inspection can 
then be extended to manifest trains, which contain a variety of different car types.  Although a 
partially automated inspection system (i.e. one that still required one or more cars or components 
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to be manually inspected) would provide incremental benefits in effectiveness, terminal 
efficiency and/or labor utilization, the benefits would be disproportionately less.  Therefore, the 
larger TDTI vision, of which AISC is a part, is being pursued by the North American railway 
industry. 
 The technical knowledge exists for the TDTI objective to become a reality, however 
additional work is required to develop and integrate the appropriate systems.  Calibration and 
validation requirements will need to be determined for AISC and other machine vision systems 
similar to those developed for wheel impact load detectors (WILDs) and acoustic bearing 
detectors (ABDs) (AAR 2010d).  In addition, each location where AISC is installed will require 
site validation, which will likely be more extensive than what is required for either WILD or 
ABD sites, due to the large number of disparate components that AISC will inspect.  Although 
the validation period may be longer for AISC and other machine vision systems, these 
technologies will benefit from the framework that has been established for previous wayside 
detector implementation. 
7.6 Conclusions  
The image acquisition system and machine vision inspection algorithms described in this 
article have demonstrated the feasibility of AISC for the improvement of the effectiveness, 
efficiency and objectivity of railcar inspections.  The initial machine vision system parameters 
needed to inspect and evaluate the health of railcar structural underframes have been determined 
and railway technology supply firms have built a subsequent test installation at TTCI.  This 
installation currently collects images of railcar underbodies at speeds up to 64 km/h (40 miles per 
hour) and provides the capability to further develop and refine the AISC system for use with 
multiple types of freight car underframes.  As a result of implementing this machine vision 
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technology and other automated inspection systems, railroads will be poised to improve 
inspection effectiveness, take advantage of the operation and management benefits of predictive 


























CHAPTER 8:  CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH 
8.1 Conclusions 
 The objective of this thesis was to determine the safety and economic impacts of 
implementing ACMT in the US railroad industry.  I identified three potential areas of cost 
savings for the railroads, driven by the goal of improved railcar condition monitoring (Figure 
1.2).  The total potential cost savings for each area are summarized in Figure 8.1.  The purpose of 
these analyses was to understand the magnitude of ACMT cost benefits and to develop 
methodologies for estimating these costs.  Although detailed cost-benefit analyses will be 
required to develop more accurate, industry-wide estimates for each of these areas of cost 
savings, individual railroads can use the methods developed in Chapters 2, 5, and 6 to estimate 










Figure 8.1 Maximum Estimated Annual Cost Savings due to the Implementation of ACMT for the 
US Railroad Industry 
 
8.1.1 Reduced Derailments 
Based on analysis of FRA accident data from 1999 to 2008, reportable equipment-caused 
mainline derailments lead to approximately $38 million per year in track and equipment damages 
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for the four largest US Class I railroads.  Thus, the potential savings from ACMT 
implementation will be a portion of this value.  The extent to which ACMT can reduce the 
likelihood of derailments will be an important area of future research.  
8.1.2 Reduced Terminal Dwell 
 The second area of potential cost savings is the reduction in labor costs associated with 
manual railcar inspection.  Using ACMT to augment manual inspections, I estimated that the US 
railroad industry could save over $35 million in labor costs per year through the reduction of 
direct operational waste.  Additional cost savings would result from implementing lean 
production techniques such as managing buffers more efficiently and reducing variability in yard 
operations.   
8.1.3 Reduced In-Service Failures 
 By increasing the effectiveness of condition monitoring, railcar components can be 
maintained more efficiently, resulting in fewer mainline ISFs.  A survey of the Class 1 railroads 
indicated that approximately 23,000 ACMT detectable ISFs occur per year.  Based on RTC 
simulation data and assuming a constant delay cost per hour, I estimated that equipment-caused 
mainline ISFs result in approximately $37 million in delay costs per year.  However, this is 
probably an underestimate due to limitations in the data.  As with the cost savings due to 
derailment reduction, the actual savings will be some portion of this value, determined by the 
distribution of specific causes of ISFs and the relative effectiveness of ACMTs to prevent 
particular causes of ISFs.  
8.2  Future Research 
8.2.1  Railcar Component Risk Metric 
To effectively estimate the potential cost savings of ACMT, a framework must be 
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developed to associate derailment and/or ISF risk with component condition.  One means of 
doing so would be to develop a risk metric for each FRA equipment-related (Group E) accident 
cause code.  For example, the cause code for a broken wheel rim (E61C) would have a much 
higher risk metric value than the cause code for an open boxcar door (E83C).  This metric would 
need to be a function of both the historical frequency in which a given cause code was 
responsible for causing a derailment or ISF and the severity of those incidents (e.g. the number 
of cars derailed).  These data are more readily available for derailments (using the FRA accident 
database) than for ISFs.  Incorporating the risk associated with ISFs will require data from 
individual Class I railroad mechanical databases.  Although these data may be difficult to 
acquire, it would be advantageous to do so, because the cost of train delays due to equipment-
caused mainline ISFs (approximately $37 million per year) is comparable to the annual track and 
equipment damages of equipment-caused mainline derailments (approximately $38 million per 
year).  Through the use of a railcar component risk metric, it would be possible to more 
accurately determine the potential cost savings of implementing ACMT.  
8.2.2  ACMT Inspection Accuracy 
After developing a railcar component risk metric, the accuracy of ACMT must be 
determined in order to assess the extent to which derailment and/or ISF risk can be reduced.  I 
provide a brief discussion of ACMT accuracy in Chapter 5 (Section 5.3.3) but only general 
estimates of correct identification and false alarm rates were possible given the data.  In order to 
develop more precise estimates for the potential cost savings of ACMT, a more rigorous analysis 
will need to be performed to determine the true correct identification and false alarm rates for 
current ACMT.  Since some technologies are still in development, the data are still insufficient to 
estimate their long-term, operational accuracy.  As railroads continue to install ACMT and 
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collect more field data, it will be possible to develop better estimates of system accuracy. 
8.2.3  Terminal Efficiency  
To better understand the potential operational waste associated with railcar inspection 
practices, the entire railcar maintenance process should be studied.  This will involve 
identification of each individual inspection sub-process and determination of the value and/or 
waste associated with each.  Value stream maps (Dirnberger 2006) can be developed and time-
in-motion studies performed in terminals to identify and quantify operational waste.  Variability 
in the railcar maintenance process can also be addressed and methodologies developed to reduce 
variability using Statistical Process Control (SPC) and Six Sigma techniques.  As Lean 
Railroading methods are further developed and refined for unit train operations, these methods 
can also be applied to other areas including intermodal trains, and more specifically, intermodal 
terminals.  Intermodal traffic is expected to continue to grow over the next several decades, and 
the impact of intermodal terminal operations on network capacity and efficiency will become 
even more important.  Applying lean production methods to these terminals could result in 
substantial cost savings in terms of reduced labor, terminal dwell and operational variability. 
8.2.4  Additional Derailment Costs 
 Another area of future research is the quantification of train delay costs due to major 
derailments.  For longer mainline service outages (e.g. 24 to 48 hours), it was impractical to 
perform RTC simulations due to the amount of time and computational resources required.  In 
addition, due to the rerouting that occurs and other complexities that accompany major 
derailments, actual train delay costs cannot be easily estimated using either linear or exponential 
estimation methods.  Other costs that could be included in this analysis are environmental clean-
up and litigation costs associated with equipment-caused derailments.  These costs, in addition to 
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train delay costs, could vary substantially, so the best approach may be to use an empirical 
analysis with historical derailment data. 
8.2.5  Additional Cost of ACMT Implementation 
Finally, future research may also include assessing additional costs associated with the 
implementation of ACMT.  Beyond the cost of purchasing, installing and maintaining the 
physical ACMT systems, other costs include: building electronic infrastructure, incorporating 
institutional changes (e.g. developing company policies regarding system operation, 
maintenance, and integration with railcar inspection and repair practices), and performing 
additional railcar maintenance afforded by improved inspection effectiveness.  A thorough 
analysis of both the costs and benefits of improved railcar condition monitoring will provide 
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